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Rule-Based Expression in Copyright Law
JEFFREY MALKANj

Should copyright be extended to a work of authorship
that consists of rules for producing another work of
authorship, or, conversely, to a work that owes its genesis
to the application of such rules? If yes for either, are 'A' and
'B' two separate works, or two dimensions of the same
work? In the leading case, Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp.,' the plaintiff claimed copyright protection for the
individual serial numbers generated by a set of proprietary
numbering rules; similar issues, however, are raised by any
work whose claim to originality comes from how its literal
elements are structured, such as compilations, games,
recipes, blueprints, score sheets, taxonomies, price
estimates, and computer programs. The more basic problem
is the relationship between function and expression in
works of authorship generally, and what freely willed selfexpression in those works requires. I trace the doctrinal2
forebears of Southco to the seminal case of Baker v. Selden,
and focus on the question of how to evaluate the copyright
status of a work whose rule-basis engenders its textual
form in an invariant and predetermined manner.
INTRODUCTION: "THE FLOW OF THE STREAM"
It is true that property in the order of words is a mental
abstraction, but so also are many other kinds of property; for
instance, the property in a stream of water, which is not3in any of
the atoms of the water, but only in the flow of the stream.

t Clinical Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
2. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
3. Jefferys v. Boosey, (1854) 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 869, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 703
(H.L.) (Erle, J.).
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On December 3, 2004, the Third Circuit handed down
its opinion in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,4 a
copyright case that dealt with the serial numbers that had
been assigned by a parts manufacturer to its inventory of
screws and fasteners. By the time it was resolved, the
Southco case had been contested for more than five years,
going back and forth between the trial court and the
appellate courts before being finally decided by the Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, with a majority opinion by (then)
Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., a concurring opinion by Judge
Edward Becker based on considerably different reasoning,
and a dissenting opinion by Judge Jane Richards Roth.5
Although the subject of the dispute could not have been
more mundane-whether
Southco's individual serial
numbers, as opposed to the parts catalogue in which they
were listed, should be eligible for copyright protection-the
court was deeply troubled by the far-reaching implications
of the issues it raised. In the end, the fairly trivial inquiry
that was the court's starting point broadened to encompass
the most basic questions about authorship and creativity.
The first part of this Article describes the Southco case,
and its Sixth Circuit counterpart, ATC Distrib. Group, Inc.
v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc.6 The focus
4. 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
5. In the Court of Appeals, Judge Alito was the author of the first Southco
opinion in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco ), 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir.
2001), and Judge Roth was the author of the second Southco opinion in Southco,
Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco II), 324 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003). The duel
between the two was resolved by the en banc decision discussed here. Judge
Roth coined the term "rule-based expression" in her dissenting opinion. See 390
F.3d at 296 (Roth, J., dissenting). Another parts numbering case, whose
copyright issues were resolved by applying Southco, was being litigated almost
concurrently. See R&B Inc. v. Needa Parts Mfg., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 684, 695
(E.D. Pa. 2005).
6. 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005). Aside from ATC, the case most directly on
point with Southco is the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Toro Co. v. R & R
Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986). Both Toro and ATC, like Southco,
involved unauthorized copying by a competitor of part numbers that had been
published in a copyright-protected catalogue. These two cases went in the same
direction as Southco, although the serial numbers in Toro were not
systematically generated by a coding process, and the court in dicta signaled
that it would have decided the case differently had the facts been otherwise. See
id. at 1213. For a survey of cases that predate 1991, see John J. Voortman,
CopyrightingPartsBooks: The Protectionof PartsInformation as Industriously
Collected or Compiled Data, 10 J.L. & COM. 219, 228-38 (1991).
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in the near perspective is on Judge Frank Easterbrook's
influential opinion in American Dental Association v. Delta
Dental PlansAssociation,7 and in the far one on the seminal
nineteenth century case from which all else follows, Baker
v. Selden.8 The second part widens the focus to encompass a
controversial series of Second Circuit decisions, all but one
from the 1990s, which addressed, in various contexts, the
protectibility of numerical data, such as baseball statistics,
used car valuations, and settlement prices. The third part
takes up the "creativity question" of what the author in
Southco did between idea and expression to create a work of
authorship. How does one "express" the "idea" of using
numbering rules to encode product information in serial
numbers? If the numbering rules are expressive, are the
numbers that result from applying the rules expressive as
well?
I draw upon literary and aesthetic theory in my
attempt to place these questions in the context of the twin
challenges posed to copyright authorship by the "check" of
rule-constraint and the "checkmate" of functionality. My
premise is that the work is a formal concept, and
authorship a type of agency; consequently, that authors as
agents do not qualify for protection unless their expression
is both freely willed and formally realized. This premise
sets the stage for me to consider why the term
"compilation," at least since the 1991 case of Feist
Publications.Inc. v. Rural Telephone Servive Co., 9 has come
to serve not just as the label for a particular category of

7. 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
8. 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (Bradley, J.).
9. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (O'Connor, J.). Feist culminated a line of cases

dealing with directories, such as telephone books, and has come to stand for the
principle that originality alone does not make an author. The plaintiff, Rural
Telephone, sued Feist, a purveyor of "yellow pages," for copying from its "white
pages" directory, which had been compiled by Rural Telephone in its role as
local telecommunications provider. Id. at 342-43. Justice O'Connor rejected
Rural Telephone's infringement claim because the "industrious collection" of
facts, in and of itself, does not provide the "creative spark" needed for copyright
protection, even if all of the author's work is original, i.e., not copied from
anyone else. Id. at 359-60. Justice O'Connor, however, did not rely solely on the
"creative spark" theory; she also held that the "selection, coordination, and
arrangement" of the names and numbers in the "white pages" directory was
unoriginal-did not originate with the author-because it was standard and
conventional. Id. at 362-63.
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works assembled out of preexisting materials, 10 but also as
a metaphor for all works of authorship. The argument is
that all works, under the microscope, dissolve into nonprotected bits and pieces, inherently no more expressive
than a lone digit. The compilation metaphor, of course, does
not relieve our anxiety about the stability and coherence of
the work, but instead sends us back to the author, looking
for answers. Something that the author does has to hold the
bits and pieces together, but what?
Ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in Feist,
the Second Circuit applied the compilation metaphor to the
design of an alphabet quilt, a work that obviously had not
been submitted for protection as a compilation of letters.
"[O]riginal works broken down into their composite parts
would usually be little more than basic unprotectible
elements like letters, colors and symbols," wrote the court
in Boisson v. Banian, Ltd." "This outcome-affording no
copyright protection to an original compilation of
unprotectible elements-would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Feist Publications.' 2
10. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006) (defining compilations and their scope
of protection).
11. 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001).
12. Id. at 272; see also Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 109
(2d Cir. 2001); Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir.
1998); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1995);
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 70-72
(2d Cir. 1994). The "protection of a complex work's 'total concept and feel' [is] a
necessary result of the Supreme Court's statement in Feist . . . that
compilations of unprotectible elements merit copyright protection insofar as
they contain an original and non-mechanical selection, coordination or
arrangement of those elements." Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v.
Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citation
omitted). Cf. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Our case law
suggests, and we hold today, that a combination of unprotectable elements is
eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough
and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination
constitutes an original work of authorship.") (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 358);
Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Every expressive work can be decomposed into elements not themselves
copyrightable . . .it is the combination of elements, or particular novel twists
given to them, that supply the minimal originality required for copyright
protection.").
An early post-Feist case to apply the compilation metaphor to a rule-based
work, specifically a videogame, was (then) Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
opinion in Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 244-47 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

2009]

RULE-BASED EXPRESSION

437

After reading Boisson, we have to ask what aesthetic or
legal principle held the alphabet quilt together as a work,
beyond the unoriginal selection and arrangement of letters
that made up its textual form. Much of the thinking that
follows this line of inquiry is analogical and even, as noted,
metaphorical. If the sequence of an author's words is like
the flow of a stream, the puzzle we continue to ponder is
how the stream coheres as well as what it really is.
I. THE SOUTHCO CASE
Where is the painting before the painter has painted.., it? Where
is the symphony before the composer has conceived it? Where is
the song before the singer has sung it? These questions have no
meaning. They are like asking, 'Where is the walk13 before I have
walked it?', 'Where is my life before I have lived it?'

The essential facts of the Southco case were not in
dispute. 14 Southco manufactures screws and fasteners that
are used by subcontractors who assemble computer and
telecommunications equipment. It catalogues its inventory
according to a process that encodes information about its
products into their nine digit serial numbers. 15 Kanebridge
distributed low-cost imitations of Southco's parts; in order
to encourage substitution, it published conversion charts
The compilation metaphor has also been applied to the work's fixation in digital
copies, which are databases of binary numbers that can be reconstituted by
programming rules into analog copies. See Dan L. Burk, Expression, Selection,
Abstraction: Copyright's Golden Braid, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 593, 611-12 (2005).
13. Isaiah Berlin, European Unity and its Vicissitudes, in THE CROOKED
TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 175, 188 (Henry
Hardy ed., 1990).

14. There was no trial; Southco I appealed the grant of a preliminary
injunction, and Southco II appealed the denial of a motion for summary
judgment. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 277-78 (3d Cir.
2004).
15. "Southco has referred to one of the numbers at issue in this case, part
number 47-10-202-10, to show how the system works. The first two digits ('47')
show that the part falls within a class of captive screws. Other digits indicate
characteristics such as thread size ('632), composition of the screw (aluminum),
and finish of the knob ('knurled)." Id. at 278. The listings of Southco's "class 47
captive screw fasteners," upon which its allegations of unauthorized copying
were based, occupy thirty-two pages of the product literature. Southco®Prism
SeriesTM 4C Captive Screw, http://www.southco.com/resources/documents/474c.en.pdf.
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that listed Southco's serial numbers and its own in parallel
columns so that customers could see that the parts were
interchangeable. 16 Southco alleged that this unauthorized
reproduction of its serial numbers infringed its copyright,
which is how more than five years of litigation began. 17
The serial numbers in Southco were the textual level of
what was likely a protectible work-Southco's parts
catalogue-but on their face had little else to commend
themselves as vehicles of expression except that they
originated with Southco. i8 The parts catalogue was literally
a listing of individual serial numbers (along with other
product information) that came from the same source and
referred to the same type of thing, screws and fasteners.
Each of these nine-digit numbers was claimed by Southco to
be a discrete, protected work. 19 The work, in its broader
sense, was also a coding process embodied in a set of
numbering rules that specified a unique number for each
screw or fastener, and allowed a user to infer the
characteristics of Southco's parts by decoding them. In
other words, there were three distinct dimensions to the
work in Southco: the individual part numbers, the
numbering rules, and the coding process by means of which
the "author" of a number applied the rules to the parts.

16. See Southco, 390 F.3d at 278-79.
17. See id. at 279-81.
18. In Feist, the copyright owner, Rural Telephone, had originated all the
local telephone numbers and did not inherit or adopt preexisting ones, but did
not claim, like Southco did, that these discrete textual elements were protected
apart from their publication in the "white pages" directory, which had been
copyrighted as a compilation of facts. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
19. This claim raised the tangential issue of whether the individual serial
numbers were analogous to the "words and short phrases" to which the
Copyright Office asserted it routinely denies registration. Southco, 390 F.3d at
285-86. Judge Alito said yes. Id. at 287. Judge Becker and Judge Roth, however,
both disputed the applicability of the Copyright Office's "words and short
phrases" regulation to Southco's facts. See id. at 289-90 (Becker, J., concurring);
id. at 297-300 (Roth, J., dissenting). The judges treated this issue more as one of
administrative than copyright law, disagreeing about the degree of Chevron or
Skidmore deference to which the Copyright Office was entitled. See id. at 286
(Alito, J., majority opinion); id. at 290 (Becker, J., concurring); id. at 299 (Roth,
J., dissenting). If the case's primary holding tested the doctrinal line between
patent and copyright, this secondary one tested that between copyright and
trademark.
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Judge Alito declined to consider whether the coding
process itself was protectible-that is, whether the
Supreme Court's decision in the 1879 case of Baker v.
Selden 20 allowed such protection-because he believed that
Southco had waived this claim. 21 Also, because Southco
denied that its catalogue was a protected compilation of
unprotected numbers, he did not have to consider whether
the numbering rules were creative in the way they selected,
coordinated, and arranged information about Southco's
products. 22 He focused instead on the relationship between
the individual numbers and the numbering rules, and
concluded that "the Southco part numbers are not protected
by copyright because they are mechanically produced by the
inflexible rules of the Southco system. ' 23 Southco failed to
satisfy the "creativity requirement" of Feist because "once
the rules of the system applicable to the particular product
class are set, the numbers themselves are generated by a
mechanical application of the rules and do not reflect even a

20. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See infra text accompanying note 46.
21. Judge Alito quoted counsel for Southco as conceding that '[t]here is no
monopoly on the system; anyone is free to use it... with impunity. It is only the
particular expression that Southco seeks to protect-the precise nine digits
which express the idea in each part number."' Southco, 390 F.3d at 285 n.4
(quoting Brief of Appellee at 14, Southco, 390 F.3d at 276 (No. 00-1102)).
Judge Roth, in her dissent, asserted that Southco had not intended to waive
protection of its copyrighted expression, which she defined as the numbering
rules it had created to describe its product line in addition to the individual part
numbers it had created by applying the rules. She justified this interpretation
of the record by distinguishing the coding process realized by Southco's
numbering rules from its "idea" of developing a coding process in the first place,
which anyone was free to take. Id. at 292 n.9 (Roth, J., dissenting). She could
also have pointed out that it would not have made any sense for Southco to
concede that competitors were free to use its numbering rules since that
concession in effect would have given away the part numbers as well. See infra
text accompanying note 89.
22. The complaint focused on the unauthorized copying of individual
numbers (viz., "the 51 part numbers for Southco's 'Class 47 captive screw
fasteners"'), Southco, 390 F.3d at 280; the district court had found that the
protectibility of the catalogue in which the numbers were compiled was not an
issue in the case. See infra note 62. Since the complaint focused on the
unauthorized copying of individual numbers or number sequences-"the 51 part
numbers for Southco's 'Class 47 captive screw fasteners"'-the copyrightability
of the catalogue itself was not an issue in the case and was not addressed by the
Court of Appeals. Southco, 390 F.3d at 279 (citation omitted).
23. Southco, 390 F.3d at 285.
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spark of creativity. '24
This lack of creativity was a flaw in Southco's claim to
be an author, but the more basic problem was its difficulty
explaining what its work of authorship was. What was
Southco's "idea" and how was it "expressed"? All authors
have ideas before they write, and all works of authorship
express those ideas in some determinate form, but there is
more to a work than a preexisting set of rules that have
been mechanically applied. A paint-by-the-numbers picture,
for instance, does not change its nature from inexpressive to
expressive after someone fills in the blanks. 25 Likewise, a
genre precedes the creation of works in that genre, but the
genre is not a process for generating works, 26 much less a
machine for manufacturing them, 27 despite the promises of
creative writing handbooks and the dreams of weary
authors. A work does not exist before an author writes it,
any more than it persists after the last copy has been lost.
Judge Learned Hand's approach to literary works in the
landmark case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.2s was

24. Id. at 283.
25. If the person who fills in the blanks has discretion to choose the colors,
however, he or she may be the author of a derivative work. See Sargent v. Am.
Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912, 918 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
26. See Note, Pure Fiction: The Attempt to Patent Plot, 19 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 231, 242 (2005) ( claiming that plot patents "do not enable the process
that yields the result they claim-a story").
27. GEORGE GISSING, NEW GRUB STREET 89 (Irving Howe ed., Houghton

Mifflin Co. 1962) (1891):
A few days ago her startled eye had caught an advertisement in the
newspaper, headed 'Literary Machine'; had it then been invented at last,
some automaton to supply the place of such poor creatures as herself, to
turn out books and articles? Alas! the machine was only one for holding
volumes conveniently, that the work of literary manufacture might be
physically lightened.
28. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). Nichols, decided in 1930 by the Second
Circuit, arose out of a complaint by Anne Nichols against the producers of a
movie, The Cohens and The Kellys, whose story line resembled that of her longrunning Broadway play, Abie's Irish Rose, with the same theme (inter-ethnic
marriage) and similar characters (young lovers and their parents). See id. at
120-21. Judge Hand closely compared the characters and plots of the two works
and concluded that, although they told the same story at some high plane of
generality or "level of abstraction," the play and the movie were sufficiently
different in their details so that they resembled each other only in idea and not
in expression. See id. at 121-22.
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to imagine a series of increasingly broad paraphrases. At
some point, he reasoned, the paraphrase will coincide with
the generic "story" behind the narrative "plot," and thus
describe both the plaintiffs and the defendant's writings. 29
Southco's numbering rules, in contrast, were not a
retrospective paraphrase of the numbers in its catalogueor a story about the numbers that could have been told
differently-but rather an embodiment of the coding
process that produced them in the first place. Before any
single serial number was expressed, it already
existed, in
30
potentia, as a literal element of the system.
Even so, the numbering rules could not be simply
dismissed as irrelevant to Southco's copyright claim.
Although the part numbers may have been mechanically
generated, they were not randomly generated. 31 The
numbering rules encoded information about the parts into
the part numbers, which allowed Southco to claim that its
numbers were the literal "expression" of a non-literal "idea,"
and hence works of authorship. There was undoubtedly an
intrinsic relationship of some sort between the numbering
29. See Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the
Scones & Faireand Merger Doctrinesfor Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779,
790-91 (2006) (paraphrasing the two plots compared in Nichols at rising levels
of abstraction). Judge Posner went so far as to suggest that Nichols gives the
copyist some leeway to paraphrase himself out of trouble. See Bucklew v.
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 930 (7th Cir. 2003).
30. In this respect, Southco's predetermined numbering system is like the
imaginary "Library of Babel," which contained an infinite number of books that
realized in textual form every possible alphabetical combination. Every book
that ever could be written already had been written and shelved somewhere in
the library, but because they had been randomly composed and arranged, most
were gibberish and no particular book could ever be located. Instead of writing
new books, denizens of the library vainly search for the one that will explain all
the others, or the one that will justify their own lives. See JORGE Luis BORGES,
The Library of Babel, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 107-118 (Andrew Hurley, trans.,
Penguin Books 1998) (1941). As the narrator of the story reflects, "the certainty
that everything has already been written annuls us, or renders us phantasmal."
Id. at 118.
31. The Eighth Circuit had rejected the plaintiffs claim in the Toro case
precisely because the "numbers were assigned to a part without rhyme or
reason." 787 F.2d at 1213. In Southco, Judge Alito declined to consider the
suggestion made at oral argument that the plaintiffs part numbers should be
protected on the same principle that protects a "work of aleatoric art," such as a
"drip painting," because the digits were not randomly selected, but rather
systematically generated. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276,
284 (3d Cir. 2004).
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rules and the part numbers, but the metaphor of story and
plot would do little to clarify what this relationship was.
A. ATC Distribution
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit, in ATC Distribution Group,
32
Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc.,
considered a nearly identical parts numbering case. ATC
was a distributor of automotive transmission parts. One of
its employees went into business with a competitor and
took with him an electronic copy of ATC's catalogue.
Although no copies of the competing catalogue were
distributed to the public, the competitor copied ATC's
individual part numbers in its internal documents and
advertising. 33 As did Southco, ATC pleaded for the court to
find a protected "middle ground" between its individual
part numbers and the abstract idea of a coding process. 34
As a last resort, ATC suggested during oral argument that even if
neither the ideas that gave rise to the part numbers, nor the
individual part numbers, qua expressions of those ideas, are
copyrightable, the part numbers taken as a whole were somehow
copyrightable as a middle ground between the two, much in the
same way that while neither the basic idea behind a novel nor the
individual words used to write it are protected, the story that
35
those words form when taken together is copyrightable.

This theory, however, did not impress the Sixth Circuit,
which denied ATC's copyright claim for the catalogue in its
entirety as well as for the individual part numbers. 36 "The
flaw ... is that there is no such middle ground in this case,"
32. 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005).
33. See id. at 704.
34. Cf. Southco, 390 F.3d at 292 (Roth, J., dissenting) ("I believe that a more
sensible middle ground is available.").
35. ATC, 402 F.3d at 710.
36. Id. Judge Boggs probably went too far when he implied in this passage
that ATC's catalogue ("the part numbers taken as a whole") was inexpressive
because it did not have a discernible structure. Id. Compilations have
structures, even though they are not narrative structures. Nevertheless, his
ruling was justified by the district court's finding that the catalogue had been
substantially copied from an earlier version by a different author, and also that
the manner in which its part numbers were arranged was insufficiently creative
to merit copyright protection. See id. at 711.
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wrote Judge Danny Boggs. 37 "Unlike the words that
comprise a novel, which add up to a story, the numbers
used in ATC's catalog only add up to a long list of numbers.
Putting all the numbers together does not make them
expressive in the way that putting words together makes a
narrative ."38
The dilemma for ATC, as for Southco, was that its
numbering rules gave literal form to its part numbers by
dictating the sequence of digits for each one, but the
numbering rules did not, in addition, take the literal form of
the part numbers they engendered in the way that a
generic story takes the literal form of a narrative plot. For
purposes of copyright protection, the literal form of the
numbering rules would have been a textual statement of
them-that is, a written text explaining how to write a part
number, or decode one-rather than a particular number
that had been realized by applying the rules. This
asymmetry was a clue that the numbering rules were
literal elements of the system that produced the numbers,
but not non-literal
elements of the numbers the system
39
produced.
Judge Alito's reasoning went one step further. 40 That

37. Id. at 710.
38. Id.; cf. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-4337, 2000 WL
21257, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000) (arguing that "each part number tells the
story of a part's size, finish, and utility").
39. "[The plot [of a novel] is part of the work itself. The user interface [of a
program] is not part of the work itself." Navitaire, Inc. v. Easyjet Airline Co.,
[2004] EWHC (Ch.) 1725 94 (Pumfrey, J.) , available at 2004 WL 3200228, at
*347; cf. Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in ComputerGenerated Works, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1185, 1215 (1986) ("[C]omputer-generated
works do not incorporate recognizable blocks of expression from the underlying
program."). In general, a computer program's code generates its 'user interface,'
but the program is an automated process that produces the interface, not a nonliteral element of the interface. 'The user interface ... is not an element of the
encoded program-that is to say, the program code-although the two are
intricately related; and, therefore, copying the interface is not, strictly speaking,
copying the program code literally or nonliterally." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright
for Functional Expression, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1998).
40. Judge Boggs in ATC was more intent on the random designation of the
individual part numbers within the functional parameters of the coding process
than on the systematic nature of the process itself. See 402 F.3d at 709 ("ATC's
allocation of numbers to parts was an essentially random process, serving only
to provide a useful shorthand way of referring to each part."). His reasoning, on
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copyright should be withheld from Southco's part numbers
followed from the critical fact that its coding process, once
in place, mechanically produced them. 41 Southco's
numbering rules would always specify the same number for
the same part, no matter who was applying the rules or
how often they were applied. As a consequence, all part
numbers based on Southco's inventory and generated by
Southco's coding process would be Southco's part numbers.
The point, moreover, is not simply that "work[s] of art,"
as Judge Alito put it, convey "complex and indeterminate
ideas" as opposed to "a few objective characteristics of the
subject," 42 such as the length, composition, and thread of a
screw or fastener. A work does not qualify for copyright
protection because the ideas that comprise its non-literal
dimension are more complex or indeterminate than those in
one that conveys only simple and definite information.
What copyright law requires of authors is that they make
43
freely willed choices during the writing of their works.
The underlying ideas in such works
are only
"indeterminate" in the sense that they do not predetermine
how they are going to be expressed. In contrast, a coding
process like Southco's leaves no choices to the author,
except, perhaps, the initial one to abide by Southco's
44
rules.
the whole, was closer to Judge Becker's in Southco than to Judge Alito's. See
infra note 70 and accompanying text.
41. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2002).
42. Id. at 284. "Indeterminate" usually means that a text or artwork is open
to various, equally defensible interpretations. Judge Alito was asserting here
that the photograph in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884), was a work of art, in contrast to the Southco parts catalogue, which was
not. Id.; see infra note 247 and accompanying text. This comment would seem to
run afoul of Bleistein v. DonaldsonLithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903),
in which Justice Holmes advised that judges should not try to calibrate a work's
copyright protection to its aesthetic merits.
43. This is why it did not help for Judge Roth to point out that "Southco's
original work had to be completed before its numbers were actually expressed."
390 F.3d at 296 (emphasis added). Copyright protects the author's expression,
not the "systematic or rule-driven" plans that may have preceded expression. Id.
"One does not infringe the secret, undisclosed thoughts of an author. One
infringes the literary product in which his original thoughts have found
expression." Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (S.D. Cal.
1942).
44. Southco's response, of course, would be that the copyright "author" was
the person who designed the numbering rules, not the person who actually used
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Southco relied on a coding process to confer creativity
on its part numbers, but the process was invariant and
functional rather than freely willed and self-expressive. If
the coding process embodied in the numbering rules was
inexpressive, so too were the numbers it generated. The
true "middle ground" between the coding process and the
individual part numbers wasn't the "story" about the parts
that could be inferred from their numbers, but the
numbering rules themselves. These rules, however, were
ineligible for protection, by virtue of Baker v.
categorically
45
Selden.
Although the individual part numbers conveyed
information about the size, finish, and utility of a part, they
were otherwise utterly inexpressive outputs of a system
rather than works of authorship. In order to serve its
purpose, the coding process had to be mechanically
implemented, and how could any mechanism, no matter
how ingeniously devised, routinely endow its products with
self-expression? The problem was to find a way of
separating the dancer from the dance.
B. "The Expression Side of the Line"
The only way out of this quandary lies at the problem's
source, in a more nuanced reading of Baker v. Selden.
Charles Selden, the plaintiff in Baker, was a Cincinnati
accountant who had devised a bookkeeping system, which
he explained in a series of copyrighted books. The books

the numbering rules to generate the individual part numbers. On this rationale,
the individual part numbers in Southco should have been protected by
copyright precisely because the numbering rules did not leave any discretion to
the user of the system.
An analogous point has been made in cases challenging the copyright
protection of computer games. Computer games that have repeatable graphic
elements, characters, and "sequence of play" are protectible as audiovisual
works. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As
long as the game's output is predictable and fixed within parameters set by the
author, then it is protected by copyright, even though the game appears to be
different each time it is played. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d
852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he player's participation does not withdraw the

audiovisual work from copyright eligibility."). The rebuttal to this response (to
close this imaginary debate) would be that copyright was not claimed for
Southco's numbering rules, but for the part numbers themselves.
45. 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
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included copies of his sample ledger forms. William C.
Baker, the defendant, developed his own bookkeeping
system, allegedly derived from Selden's, and marketed a
version of the forms to municipalities throughout the state.
Baker succeeded in business where Selden had failed. After
Selden's death, his widow pursued Baker all the way to the
Supreme Court in a futile effort to achieve vindication.4 6
The issue as framed by the court in Baker was whether
the inventor of a bookkeeping system could obtain a
monopoly over its use by asserting his copyright in a
treatise that contained the system's explanation. The
answer was no. "The description of the art in a book, though
entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for
an exclusive claim to the art itself," wrote Justice Joseph P.
Bradley.4 7 The "essence" of a literary composition or book
lies in its "statement" about the rules and methods of a
useful art rather than in the practice of the useful art.4 8
"This alone," he warned, "is what is secured by the
49
copyright."
Of course, Southco's work of authorship was not a
treatise or a "how-to" manual that explained the "useful
art" of part numbering. Southco asserted its copyright to
prevent Kanebridge from publishing a conversion table for
replacement parts; in essence, this was the same as denying
the public any opportunity to apply its coding process to
non-Southco screws and fasteners. There was, however, no
reason why the realization of Southco's idea of a coding
process in the form of its numbering rules, which generated
the individual part numbers, could not be treated as if those

46. What gave a measure of suspense to the outcome was that the specimen
pages supplied by the author, Selden, were not identical to those published by
Baker, although they were substantially similar. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 100 (1879); Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening
the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 159-93 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). The

possible implications of this fact, however, were passed over in silence; the
opinion did not address the issue of liability for non-literal copying. One of its
lingering ambiguities is whether the outcome would have been less favorable to
Baker had he directly reproduced Selden's forms instead of devising his own.
See Weinreb, supra note 37, at 1175 n.104.
47. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id.
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rules were a textual statement about the coding process as
well as an operational element of the process.
In her Southco dissent, Judge Roth embraced the claim
that the numbering rules were a protected element of the
work because they expressed and thereby gave form to
Southco's ideas about how to organize an assortment of
50
parts, in addition to generating particular part numbers.
"Once Southco's numbering rules are properly placed on the
expression side of the line," she wrote, "the distinction
between Southco's rules and the resulting numbers is
legally insignificant. The numbers are part of Southco's
original expression, even if they are dictated by another
part of that expression-the numbering rules."' 5 1 The
majority's position, in contrast, was "akin to limiting
copyright protection in a novel to the words as they appear
on the page."52 If this is true, one could justifiably accuse
the Third Circuit in Southco of reverting to the primitive
theory of the work espoused by its nineteenth-century
predecessor in Stowe v. Thomas,53 at least for those types of
works it disfavors. "[I]f the majority's division of Southco's
rules from their expression were applied generally,"
of rule-based original
complained Judge Roth, "large swaths
'54
works would be denied protection.

50. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2002)
(Roth, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 296. Professor Weinreb, in a different context, explained the
awkward locution as follows. The idea-expression dichotomy implies "idea" as
the level of generality at which infringement was avoided, and "expression" as
the level at which infringement occurred, while, in fact "the true content of the
distinction was between the abstract (idea) and the concrete (idea), both of
which could be expressed in words. Calling the concrete idea 'expression' meant
that for copyright purposes, there was expression (words) of the expression
(concrete idea) of the idea (abstract idea)." Weinreb, supra note 37, at 1170.
52. Southco, 390 F.3d at 292.
53. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). In
1853, Harriet Beecher Stowe was denied relief for the unauthorized translation
of her novel, Uncle Tom's Cabin,because the translated German text was not a
literal copy of the original English text. Justice Grier defined the work of
authorship as "that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the
eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed." Id. at 206-07. The work's
"identity," he said, does not consist in the "ideas, knowledge or information
communicated, but in the same conceptions clothed in the same words, which
make it the same composition." Id. at 207.
54. Southco, 390 F.3d at 297.
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Southco's copyright, moreover, did not monopolize the
art of parts numbering or the field of coding processes; it
only monopolized its own particular numbering rules. A
better analogy would be to the copyright granted to the
author of a novel. Thomas Pynchon's copyright on Gravity's
Rainbow, for example, did not confer a monopoly on the
publication of novels--only a monopoly on the publication of
Gravity's Rainbow. 55 Likewise, Southco only claimed a
monopoly on its own part numbers and its own numbering
rules, not a monopoly on all part numbers and all
numbering rules. The monopoly did not extend to other
coding processes-which would require other numbering
rules and generate other part numbers-or to the idea of
applying numerical codes to screws and fasteners.
"Granting Southco the exclusive right to create encoded
part numbers would stifle innovation," Judge Roth
conceded. 56 "But is it not equally clear that the majority's
approach-which would limit expression to the literal
elements of a work and then bar copyrightability for lack of
originality-is too narrow?" 57
C. Compilation as a Metaphor
Even if Baker v. Selden could be neutralized in this
way, however, the basic question remained unanswered of
what is creative, original, or expressive about a set of
numbering rules as such or the coding process it embodies.
What exactly does it mean to "express" an "idea" about a
coding process? The word "express" refers to something
more than applying or even creating a method for
generating data. It's not difficult to identify what a coding
process encodes-the physical specifications of an item, or
other factual information that can be conveyed by
numbers-but that is not the same as identifying what the
creator of the process "expresses."
Judge Roth responded initially to this objection with an
exceedingly modest standard of what counts as expression
on the literal or textual level. On this point, she found
support from Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion for the
55. THOMAS PYNCHON, GRAvITY'S RAINBOW (1973).

56. Southco, 390 F.3d at 293.
57. Id.
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Seventh Circuit in American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental
Plans Ass'n.5 8 One of the issues in American Dental was
whether the American Dental Association's (ADA)
numerical code for dental procedures was an original work
of authorship. 59 The American Dental court had held that
even these unembellished numbers were protectible works
because the authors of the code exercised discretion in
picking which particular numbers to use and how many
digits to assign to each procedure. 60 Likewise in Southco,
Judge Roth observed that "while the selection of product
specifications to be encoded in a given product line may be
dictated largely by industry considerations, there would
seem to be no limit to the number of ways those
specifications could be encoded. '61 Hence, she thought it
significant that there was "nothing predetermined about
the length of a part number. '62 Choosing the number of
digits for part numbers and assigning values to them were
"relatively mundane choices," 63 but enough to satisfy the
Feist standard for creativity. The cause of defending an
author whose expressive urges were spent on such feeble

58. 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). In her opinion for the panel in Southco II
(i.e., the opinion reversed by the Third Circuit sitting en banc), Judge Roth had
instructed the district court to reconsider the relevance of American Dental. See
Southco, 324 F.3d at 197.
59. In addition, that is, to the ADA's underlying categorization of dental
practices and to the verbal descriptions that accompanied its numerical ones.
60. See Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 979. As an example, Judge Roth pointed to
the following passage in Judge Easterbrook's opinion:
The number assigned to any one of these three descriptions could have
had four or six digits rather than five; guided tissue regeneration could
have been placed in the 2500 series rather than the 4200 series; again
any of these choices is original to the author of a taxonomy, and
another author could do things differently.
Southco, 390 F.3d at 294 n.13 (citing 126 F.3d at 979).
61. Southco, 390 F.3d at 293-94. In part, this statement was a response to
Judge Becker's concurring opinion. Judge Becker's position, which relied on
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997)-a case that dealt
with four digit telephone "command codes"-was that the numbering rules were
unoriginal under the scnes e faire doctrine because they were determined by
something outside the author's control, manufacturing standards in the
telecommunications and computer industries. See 390 F.3d at 287-88 (Becker,
J., concurring).
62. Southco, 390 F.3d at 294 (Roth, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
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preferences, of course, is not a particularly compelling one.
Judge Becker, in contrast, argued that "[a]rbitrary choices
such as these do not satisfy the originality requirement. As
far as the purpose of the Copyright Clause is concerned,
there is no reason to give an incentive to churning out
arbitrary symbols,64 for purely arbitrary decisions do not
advance 'science."'
There was more to Southco's position, however, because
the coding process was not just the way its part numbers
were generated, but also the way its work of authorship
was structured. The coding process realized in the
numbering rules was the formal principle underlying the
part numbers, in the same way that Judge Hand in Nichols
suggested that the "characters and sequence of incident" in
a dramatic work is the "skeleton" that supports and
pervades the whole. 65 As I proposed earlier, the vehicle for
this claim is an analogy between the original work of
authorship and a compilation based on preexisting
materials-by the use, that is, of compilation as a
metaphor. The argument is that any rejection of a
numbering system as a formal principle, and one that is
independently protectible as an expressive element of the
work, would be inconsistent with Feist v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.
Admittedly, Southco had distanced itself from any
claim that its parts catalogue actually was a compilation for
the obvious reason that such a claim would have left its
discrete
elements-the
individual
part numbersunprotected. 66 In her dissent, however, Judge Roth argued

64. Id. at 288; cf. Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th
Cir. 1986) ('We are left, then, with the accidental marriage of a part and a
number. We do not believe that such a marriage produces an original work of
authorship."). The arbitrary choices reflected in Southco's numbering rules
sound more like those that go into selecting a trademark, where arbitrariness is
a virtue (see, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
n.6 (2d Cir. 1976)), than into creating a work of authorship, where arbitrary
choice is a telling sign of inexpressiveness.
65. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
66. The district court reported that "Southco offered no evidence that any of
the Handbook registrations were under the Compilation provisions of the
Copyright Act, under which only the selection, coordination, and arrangement
of the Handbook would be protected," and further that "Southco credibly
maintains that the entire content of each Handbook is original authorship, not
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that Southco's parts catalogue was like a compilation in the
sense that its numbering system was the non-literal
dimension of a text that gave expressive value to the work
as a whole. Therefore, a decision in favor of Southco was
required by the Supreme Court's
decision in Feist as well as
by the Copyright Act itself.67
Although ideas about selection, coordination, and
arrangement are often the only original element
contributed by the author of a compilation, compilations are
nonetheless eligible for copyright protection. Once the
author's ideas are applied to a particular body of
information-even if the application itself is systematic or
mechanical-they become protectible as ideas that are
textually realized in the form of the compilation. Judge
Roth inferred what she thought was the obvious relevance
of Feist to the Southco case: if compilations qualify for
copyright because their non-textual dimension is original to
the author, so too must rule-based works, such as Southco's,
which may have lacked any pretense of expressive value on
the textual level of the individual part numbers, but all the
same expressed the author's intentions and choices on the
non-textual level of the coding process and its numbering
rules. 68
D. American Dental
This conclusion, again, was consistent with the Seventh
Circuit's position in American Dental. The ADA's Code on
Dental Procedures and Nomenclature represented in
numerical form its classification of dental procedures; the
principal question, as Judge Easterbrook saw it, was
whether the underlying plan was expressive. 69 If it was,
then it did not matter whether the work's literal text was
a compilation of material in the public domain." See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-4337, 2000 WL 21257, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000).
67. "[A] broad rule limiting 'expression' to the literal elements of a work
would substantially deny protection to compilations, notwithstanding the
express provision of the copyright statute conferring protecting [sic] such
works." Southco, 390 F.3d at 297 (citing CCC Info. Servs.v. Maclean Hunter
Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994)).
68. Id. at 297.
69. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 981 (7th
Cir. 1997)
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generated afterwards. Judge Easterbrook and Judge Roth
even
would agree that "[c]reativity marks the expression
'70
devised.
been
has
scheme
fundamental
the
after
Judge Easterbrook also stipulated that the "work" was
not a copyrighted compilation, 71 although plainly it was like
a compilation in the sense that its expressive value, under
Feist, was based on classification, that is, the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of information. Instead,
72
Judge Easterbrook called the ADA's Code, a "taxonomy."
The test for originality when dealing with a taxonomy is
whether the scheme is expressive, which, in a minimal
sense, can be reduced to the question of whether it could
have been done differently: "[t]here can be multiple, and
and
equally original, biographies of the same person's life,
'73
multiple original taxonomies of a field of knowledge.
What made the ADA's classification scheme original
was that it originated with the author and was not imposed
by the inherent structure of the subject. "Butterflies may be
grouped by their color, or the shape of their wings, or their
feeding or breeding habits, or their habitats, or the
attributes of their caterpillars, or the sequence of their
DNA," wrote Judge Easterbrook, "each scheme of

70. Id. at 979.
71. "Note that we do not conclude that the Code is a compilation covered by
17 U.S.C. § 103. It could be a compilation only if its elements existed
independently and the ADA merely put them in order." Id. at 980. Although the
dental procedures classified in the ADA's Code of course existed independently
of the Code, Judge Easterbrook was correct that the Code's categories and
descriptions of them did not. Likewise, Southco's parts catalogue was not a
compilation of screws and fasteners, but a work of authorship that assigned
numerical descriptions to an inventory of screws and fasteners.
This distinction does not rule out the possibility, however, of characterizing
Southco's catalogue as a compilation of part numbers, or the ADA's Code as a
compilation of billing numbers, just as the telephone directory in Feist was a
compilation of phone numbers (albeit one that lacked originality). See ATC
Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700, 710 n.6 (6th Cir. 2005) (questioning Judge Easterbrook's assumption that
"the elements of a compilation must exist independently of the act of
compilation"). Part numbers, billing numbers, and phone numbers are all types
of data that can be protected in the form of compilations against unauthorized
wholesale reproduction.
72. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 980.
73. Id. at 979.
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classification could be expressed in multiple ways." 74
Likewise, "[d]ental procedures could be classified by
complexity, or by the tools necessary to perform them, or by
the parts of the mouth involved, or by the
anesthesia
'75
employed, or in any of a dozen different ways.
In terms of Southco's copyright claim, the issue was
whether its product line could have been classified
differently. Judge Roth avoided using the term "taxonomy"
with good reason because Judge Becker, in his concurring
opinion, had the better side of the argument on this point;
putting aside insignificant variations, there apparently was
only one correct way to do it. The thought process behind
Southco's numbering system, as Judge Becker put it,
amounted to little more than "Screw X is the same material
as Screw Y, but a different material from Screw Z; Screw A
is the same amount longer than Screw B as Screw C is
longer than Screw D."76 The classification scheme was
"dictated by industry standards, customer preferences, or
the objective characteristics of the captive screw itself. The
scones & faire doctrine, therefore, dispels the notion that
there was the requisite originality in Southco's selection'77of
characteristics and values to merit copyright protection.
1. The Distinction of Taxonomies From Systems. Even if

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2004); cf.
ATC, 402 F.3d at 707 ('The only way to express the prediction that a
maximum of four additional types of sealing ring might be developed is to leave
four numbers unallocated, and the only way to express the idea that a novel
part should be placed with the sealing rings rather than with the gaskets is to
place that part with the sealing rings."). See supra note 38.
77. 390 F.3d at 289 (Becker, J., concurring). The scenes & faire doctrine, as
originally defined by Judge Yankwich, was only applicable to conventional
scenes in works of fiction. "The French refer to them as scenes & faire,-that is,
scenes which must follow a certain situation." Leon R. Yankwich, Originalityin
the Law of Intellectual Property (Its Meaning From a Literary and Legal
Standpoint), 11 F.R.D. 457, 462 (1952). The term became more commonly used
after 1976, when the Second Circuit applied it in Reyher v. Children'sTelevision
Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1976). See Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The
Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 88 (1989). The doctrine, however,
has been extended in more recent cases (as here, in Judge Becker's Southco
concurrence) to describe any features in a work that are dictated by functional
considerations; in this guise, the doctrine-not limited to the narrative arts-is
merger by another name.
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the classification scheme is original, however, as it possibly
was in American Dental, we have to ask whether it is
protectible as a work of authorship or whether, to the
contrary, it is not protectible as a procedure, process,
system, or method of operation because it falls under the
rule of Baker v. Selden.78 Bypassing the Section 102(b)
categories in favor of the word "taxonomy" helped Judge
Easterbrook to avoid any implication that the ADA's work
was functional rather than expressive. "[W]hat could it
mean to call the Code a 'system'?" he asked. 79 "This
taxonomy does not come with instructions for use, as if the
Code were a recipe for a new dish. . . . The Code is a
taxonomy, which may be put to many uses. These uses may
be or include systems; the Code is not."8 0 His rationale was
that "[a] taxonomy is a way of describingitems in a body of
knowledge or practice; it is81not a collection or compilation of
bits and pieces of 'reality."'
The problem with this rationale is that taxonomies are
not so much freely imagined accounts of nature or society as
they are products of an empirically-based, scientific method
of classification.8 2 In botany and zoology, taxonomies are
based on seven mandatory categories: kingdom, phylum,
class, order, family, genus, and species.8 3 Within these
taxonomic categories, the scientist must conform to the
evolutionary relations between organisms (i.e., their
phylogeny) as well as to the framework of classification and
nomenclature set up by taxonomists of the past. Even if the

78. A work of authorship, under current law, does not encompass any "idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). This provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976 codifies Baker's holding.
79. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 980.
80. Id. at 980-81.
81. Id. at 980. Judge Easterbrook maintained that "the actual description is
original to the ADA, not knuckling under to an order imposed on language by
some 'fact' about dental procedures." Id. at 979. Of course, there are facts about
dental procedures that must have imposed significant constraints on the ADA's
classification of them.
82. See, e.g., KENNETH D. BAILEY, TYPOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES (1994).

AND

TAXONOMIES:

AN

83. See Encyclopsedia Britannica Online, Taxonomy, http://www.search.eb.
com/eb/article-9110579 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
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word "taxonomy" is used in a broader sense as the science of
classifying anything, not just plants and animals, it serves
as a system or rule-basis for putting bits and pieces of
reality-an assorted box of screws and fasteners, for
example-into their proper order.
Aside from this general objection, one might begin by
questioning Judge Easterbrook's distinction between a
coding system and a code that is merely put to use within a
system. This is especially so if the code was created for the
purpose of being used in a recordkeeping system, just as
Selden's ledger pages were created for the purpose of being
used in a bookkeeping system.8 4 Even though the ADA's
Code does not come with instructions for use, the Code's
function should be obvious to anyone using it for
recordkeeping work. (The insurance form itself may supply
instructions for how to use the Code.)8 5 In addition, the
possibility of different approaches to the job of constructing
a code does not mean that any particular construction is
less systematic-and therefore less subject to Baker v.
86
Selden-than if there were no alternatives.
Judge Easterbrook's illustrations, moreover, did not
entirely support the distinction of taxonomies from systems.
He claimed, for example, that "[t]he Maroon Book and the

84. "No one would read the ADA's Code for pleasure; it was designed and is
used for business (for records of patients' dental history or making insurance
claims) rather than aesthetic purposes." Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 978. The ADA
publishes a blank form for reporting dental services to a patient's dental benefit
plan (line 29 is the "procedure code"). Besides the forms themselves, the ADA
publishes "comprehensive form completion instructions" in a copyrighted
booklet, CDT-Current Dental Terminology, which may be ordered at
http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/topics/claimform.asp (last visited Jan. 21,
2009).
85. Some insurers specifically explain how to fill out line 29: 'Use
appropriate dental procedure code from current version of Code on Dental
Procedures
and
Nomenclature."
ADA
Dental
Claim
Form,
http://unchealthcare.org/site
(click on "Human Resources"; then follow
"Employee Benefits" hyperlink; then follow "Employee Benefit Forms"
hyperlink; then follow "NC Flex Claim Form: Dental Care" hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009).
86. 'The availability of a variety of ways for classifying dental procedure
information should not make a particular choice copyright protectable any more
than the availability of a large number of accounting systems made Selden's
particular system protectable." Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and
Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 439, 498 (2003).
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Bluebook offer different taxonomies of legal citations. 87 In
fact, the Bluebook's subtitle is "A Uniform System of
Citation, 's s and both citation manuals provide rules for
generating new, correct citations rather than for classifying
old ones. Another illustration of a taxonomy was the West
Key Number System, "which is designed as a

comprehensive index to legal topics." 8 9 It is true that the

West Key Number System is a descriptive statement about
American law in the form of a topical outline, but it is also a
"finding tool," i.e., a literal element of West's method for
performing legal research. As embodied in textual form, the
Key Number System is a compilation of self-generated data
(the key numbers), and it is also the non-literal dimension
of West's digests of its federal, regional, and state reporters.
Copyright does not allow competitors to copy the entire
compilation of key numbers or to write their own competing
digests based on West's topics. Lawyers, however, are
encouraged to use West's system of key numbers even if
that means copying individual ones as needed.
Finally, Judge Easterbrook's approach to "taxonomies"
did not seem to take Justice Bradley's admonitions about
the limits of copyright fully into account. It is doubtful that
a lepidopterist would have any cause to complain because a
museum organized an exhibit of butterfly specimens
taxonomically, using his or her taxonomy. 90 This is because
87. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 979.
88. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (emphasis added). Similarly, the first sentence
of the Maroon Book (i.e., The Chicago Manual of Legal Citation) states that,
"The following set of guidelines provides a simple, workable system of citation
for legal writing." Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1343 app. at 1353 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO MANUAL OF LEGAL CITATION 7 (Univ. of Chicago Law Review et al. eds.,
1989)). Also, postdating the 1997 American Dental case, the ALWD Citation
Manual is subtitled A ProfessionalSystem of Citation.See DARBY DICKERSON &
ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS, ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL

SYSTEM OF CITATION (3d ed. 2006) (2000).
89. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 978.
90. The reproduction of a chapter or diagram from a scholarly paper or
textbook would be considered copyright infringement if done without the
publisher's permission and beyond the bounds of fair use, but using the
taxonomy for scholarly or curatorial pursuits is generally permissible, as long
as proper attribution is provided. If a scholar published a modified version of
the taxonomy without attributing credit to the primary author, the charge
would likely be academic plagiarism rather than copyright infringement.
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the taxonomy would be considered a system of
classification, not the expression of a system. The author's
"expression" would be the writing that explained the
taxonomy, rather than the taxonomy itself.9 1
2. Necessary Elements of the System. All the same, Judge
Easterbrook's ruling in American Dental can be reconciled
with Southco, even though his rationale supports Judge
Roth's dissent rather than Judge Alito's majority opinion.
This is apparent when the facts in American Dental are
compared to those of Baker v. Selden, the tributary that
feeds both American Dental and Southco. The problem with
Selden's infringement claim was that Baker could not use
the system described by Selden's accounting treatise
without copying his forms in some manner. The ADA, on
the other hand, had no objection to "any dentist, any
insurer, anyone at all"92 using the Code's numbers on
billing forms or elsewhere, which meant literally copying
them. The grievance behind the ADA's lawsuit arose from
publication of an adulterated version of the Code under a
different title-that is, an unauthorized derivative work 9 3which had the effect of diluting the Code's value as the core
of a standardized billing system. 94

91. Although the non-literal dimension of any compilation could loosely be
called a "taxonomy," a taxonomy is textually realized when its classification
scheme is explained, while a compilation is not textually realized until its
classification scheme is used to organize a particular body of facts. This makes
taxonomies appear more descriptive, and compilations more systematic. The
authorship of a compilation, moreover, has two distinct phases: an analytical
phase that establishes its categories, and an application phase that inserts facts
into the categories. (These two phases, indeed, may have two different
"authors.") On the use-explanation dichotomy in Baker, see infra note 204 and
accompanying text.
92. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 981.
93. Id. ("Section 102(b)... does not permit Delta to copy the Code itself, or
make and distribute a compilation of billing numbers."). See supra note 65.
Indeed, Judge Easterbrook described Baker's near-reproductions of Selden's
forms as unauthorized derivative work based on the Code, any more than Baker
could copy Selden's book. See Samuelson, supra note 46, at 193 (describing
Baker as a "second comer" who built upon Selden's work).
94. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 981 ('The fact that Delta used most of the Code
but made modifications is the reason ADA objects, for variations salted through
a convention impede communication."). Professor Samuelson, who was
otherwise critical of Judge Easterbrook's opinion in American Dental, agreed
that the ADA's Code was designed to be a standard billing code. She drew the
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Hence Southco's copyright claim was different from the
ADA's in American Dental. The ADA conceded that the
dental profession, its constituency, had the right to use its
numbering system, even if using it meant copying its
numbers. In contrast, Southco was seeking to prevent
Kanebridge, its competitor, from copying the part numbers
of its screws and fasteners. Neither Kanebridge nor anyone
else had an interest in plagiarizing Southco's parts
catalogue, as such. What Kanebridge did have an interest
in doing was in using (i.e., standardizing) Southco's part
numbers, either individually or in sequence on a conversion
table, to identify the items referenced by the numbers
for
95
the purpose of selling interchangeable components.
There is another way of describing this problem. The
doctrine of merger in copyright law states the proposition
that in some situations there is only one way to express an
idea. The doctrine goes back to the puzzle of how the work's
literal and non-literal levels are related. The merger
doctrine's application to the Southco case follows from
Baker v. Selden.96 Southco's numbering rules were the
opposite conclusion,

though, arguing

that standardization weighs heavily

against, and perhaps even precludes, copyright protection:
[I]ndustry standard codes promulgated by organizations such as the
AMA and ADA may be unprotectable systems under § 102(b). Such
codes and other systematic organizations of information are certainly
uncopyrightable ... when systematizing the information will produce
social benefits from uniformity and the social costs of diversity would
be high. Standard systems of this sort are born uncopyrightable.
Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193,
214-15 (2007).
95. The same could be said about the purpose of the defendant in Pantone,
Inc. v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a case that may
have been wrongly decided in light of Southco. In Pantone, the work was a
booklet in the form of seventy-two pages of color samples that pictorially
depicted a system for matching printing inks. The Pantone defendant (much
like Kanebridge) provided a conversion table that listed serial numbers in
parallel columns for the plaintiff's and defendant's inks. Id. at 553. The court
took the conversion table as evidence of wrongful copying rather than as a
permissible cross-reference between different numerical product designations.
Id. at 550.
96. In his majority opinion, Judge Alito, without mentioning Baker v. Selden
by name, determined that Southco had conceded that case's relevance to the
coding process and therefore was precluded from claiming a copyright on the
numbering rules. See Southco Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 285 n.4
(3d Cir. 2004). However, he did not take the next step, which I sketch out here,
of applying the merger doctrine by explaining that Southco's individual part
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embodiment of a coding process-a system or method of
operation-and the system could not be used without
copying an aspect of Southco's expression, the individual
part numbers produced by the system.
This is because Southco's numbering rules provided
only one way to "express" a particular part number.
Southco may have been entitled to a copyright for a work
that explained its coding process and may even have been
entitled to a copyright for a work that simply stated the
numbering rules (although such an unadorned statement
might have been too inexpressive to qualify for copyright).
It could not, however, invoke its copyright to prevent the
public from applying its coding process to non-Southco
components, just as Selden could 97not prevent the public
from using his bookkeeping system.
The objection, of course, could have been raised that
Kanebridge did not use Southco's numbering rules, but
merely copied its part numbers. 98 The lawsuit was based on
copying the numbers, not on using the rules. The difference
between the two, however, is inconsequential because using
Southco's numbering rules or copying its part numbers
would amount to exactly the same thing-an identical
number. It would be impossible for a court to determine
numbers were likewise precluded from copyright protection because they were
comparable to Selden's blank forms-necessary components of the system that
had to be reproduced in order for the public to use it.
97. Judge Roth argued that if this limitation were to be broadly applied,
Weight Watcher's point system for rating foods could be appropriated
by Jenny Craig or any other competitor if it could be shown that
Weight Watcher's point allotments followed predetermined formulae
(based on calories per ounce or other considerations). Also, many
compilations that would seem to pass Feist's low creativity threshold
would be denied protection if they happen to be the product of
predetermined rules.
Southco, 390 F.3d at 297 (Roth, J., dissenting). Exactly, but-as the Eleventh
Circuit recognized in Warren Publishing,Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d
1509, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1997)-these outcomes are a consequence of Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act. See also infra note 151. In addition, the latter
concern is overstated; the author of a compilation can always prevent others
from applying the work's rules for selection, coordination, and arrangement to
the same facts to recreate the same work, which should be adequately protective
for most purposes.
98. And, in fact, it was raised, but Judge Alito did not think this attempt by
Southco to circumvent Baker made any difference to the outcome. See Southco,
Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2001).
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whether Kanebridge had or had not mechanically
implemented the numbering rules, and it would not greatly
matter whether it had or had not jumped through the hoop
of doing so. 99

II. "THE SPECIAL CASE OF MERGER"
I have heard many People say Give me the Ideas. It is no matter
what Words you put them into & others say Give me the Design it
is no matter for the Execution. These People know <Enough of
Artifice but> Nothing Of Art. Ideas cannot be Given but in their
minutely Appropriate Words nor Can a Design be made without
its minutely Appropriate Execution[.]100

The doctrine of merger, which is understood to be a
"special case" 10 ' of the idea-expression dichotomy, deals
with constraints on expression in a way that includes
Southco, but covers a far broader range of situations in
which the author's expressive options are restricted by the
inherent limitations of the work's subject matter rather
than by a preexisting formula or rule-basis which the
author is required to apply. The doctrine was foreshadowed
by the unprotected status of Selden's blank forms. Indeed,

99. This is also true more generally:
If the copyright system were to recognize rights in uncreative work,
courts would be overwhelmed by difficult evidentiary disputes. Two
parties would come forward with remarkably similar works of
authorship, and the court would find it virtually impossible to
determine whether one copied from the other (impermissible
infringement) or whether, instead, any similarity between the works
was just a natural outgrowth of the fact that both works lack
creativity.
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 686-87
(2003).
100. WILLIAM BLAKE, Chaucers CanterburyPilgrimsBeing a Complete Index
of Human Charactersas They Appear Age After Age, in THE POETRY AND PROSE
OF WILLIAM BLAKE 560, 565 (David V. Erdman ed., 3d prtg. 1968) (1965).

101. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 712 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J.,
dissenting in part):
[Tihe Baker Court's initial holding, distinguishing between an 'art' and
an explanation of that art, has not been seriously challenged, and has
steadily evolved and been refined into what is commonly referred to
today as the idea/expression dichotomy, a concept which includes
within its bounds the special case of merger.
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as Judge Richard Posner pointed out, "[t]he standard
citation remains Baker v. Selden"'10 2 because Selden's
method merged
with his realization of it in the sample
03
ledger pages.'
The usual explanation is that merger occurs because
the literal and non-literal dimensions of the work have
become impossible to separate. The form of the author's
expression has "merged" into its substance and
copyrighting the expression would take the idea out of the
public domain. My account differs from the usual
explanation in its emphasis. The accepted rationale is that
the public domain would be impoverished if a copyright
were to be awarded to the first person to express an idea
that can only be expressed in one way. My emphasis is on
self-expression; when there is only one way to express an
idea, the form of expression will be predetermined by the
104
work's substance rather than freely chosen by its author.
The merger doctrine for literary works is perhaps
better described as a special case of the fact-expression
dichotomy, rather than idea-expression, because the
author's unique selection of words or numbers becomes a
fact itself as well as a representation of one. In 2002, the
Fifth Circuit applied this fact-based version of the merger
doctrine in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International,Inc.'0 5 to hold that a municipal building code
was ineligible for copyright, even though it was essentially
102. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 1992);
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003); MARSHALL LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 2.14[B][2] (4th ed. 2005) ("[T]he doctrine of
Baker v. Selden implies that there are some instances where the use of a system
or process necessitates the identical copying of the author's expression of the
system or process.").
103. The case also gave rise to the rule, enforced by U.S. Copyright Office
regulations, that blank forms are not protectible per se. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c)
(2008); Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106-07 (9th Cir.
1990).
104. A different way of putting this would be to say that a simple rule, such
as "apply hook to wall," fails the creativity requirement because it is so obvious
in substance and invariant in form that it elicits no intellectual labor from the
author. See CONTu REPORT, infra note 229, at 20; cf. Feist v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
105. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 801-02, 806 (5th
Cir. 2002).
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the same text as a copyright-protected model code. "The
codes are 'facts' under copyright law," wrote the court;
"They are the unique, unalterable expression of the 'idea'
that constitutes local law.' 10 6 Veeck was the rare instance
where the merger doctrine was applied to a literary
work to
7
exonerate the defendant from verbatim copying. 0
Another noted example, and perhaps the first to apply
the merger doctrine in this way, was the 1967 case of
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,108 in which the First
Circuit held that a simple set of rules for a sweepstakes
contest was too elementary to be expressed in any other
form of words.'0 9 A similar concern lies behind the
regulation that rejects registrations for words and short
phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, and arguably

106. Id. at 801. Veeck may have been a case of function-expression as well as
fact-expression merger. While a statute need not be copied to be "used" as a
guide to lawful conduct, the "function" of a statute is also to serve the due
process of law, which requires public notice, i.e., the copying and distribution of
its text. In its principal holding, the Veeck court cited a due process rationale.
Id. at 799. It did not, however, go so far as to say that unlimited free publication
of a statute is necessary to satisfy due process. See id. The court,, moreover, put
greater emphasis on the legal fiction of "citizen authorship" than on any concern
about due process. See id. This is why generalizing from Veeck could be
misleading; just because a text describes, or even prescribes, a function, even a
legal one, does not mean that it is not protectible as a text, as long as the
exercise of the function does not require wholesale and verbatim copying of the
text. See infra note 221.
107. Less than six months after Veeck was decided, the Second Circuit
rejected a similar fact-based merger argument in Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch,
Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2002), which was
premised on the somewhat dubious claim that a prayer book translation
authorized by the chief rabbi was the sole viable version within the Lubavitch
community.
108. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967); see John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 119, 127 (1991).
109. Morrissey, however, may have been a "blank forms" rather than a
"game rules" case. The simple entry instructions were unprotected for the same
reason that any blank entry form (had one been provided by the sponsor) would
have been unprotected. Both would be equally literal elements of the game
because the game rules were little more than an explanation of how the
contestant could draft a homemade entry. The rules described a blank form and
were the legal equivalent of one, as well.
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applies to Southco's serial numbers as well. 110 The claim
would be that the numbers were "facts" about the parts
listed in Southco's catalogue and, as such, could not be
"expressed" in any other way."'
Most courts, however, make use of the merger
doctrine as a rule of thumb rather than a bright-line rule,
and are inclined to limit the scope of protection rather than
deny protection altogether;" 2 a residual "thin" copyright
still can be enforced against literal or self-confessed
copyists. 1" 3 The paradox is that the concept of merger, in

110. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2008); cf. Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or
Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 591-600 (2005). On this
issue in Southco, see supra note 17.
111. Cf.

Alan

L.

Durham,

The

Random

Muse:

Authorship

and

Indeterminacy, 4 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 594 (2002) ("One could argue ...
that the plaintiffs market dominance has rendered its numbering scheme a
'fact' to which others must refer in order to compete."); Justin Hughes, Created
Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 67
(2007) ("[Ihf these part names had become industry standards, the names were
social facts-facts by common agreement ... that had become basic to carrying
out nonexpressive activities.").
112. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444
(9th Cir. 1994); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984).
113. The Second Circuit's policy of applying the merger doctrine at the
infringement stage, rather than applying it to the threshold determination of
copyrightability, likewise has the effect of preventing literal copyists from
availing themselves of the merger defense if their copying has been admitted or
proven. The doctrine of merger comes into play only if the infringing work could
have been independently created, and there is no way for the court to evaluate
the merits of this defense because any attempt to express the author's idea
would have produced an identical form of expression. Cf. Kregos v. Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet J., dissenting in part)
(complaining that "if a defendant has actually copied the plaintiffs work, it is
unlikely to be allowed to rely on merger to avoid liability" and arguing that
"[t]his approach owes little if anything to the strictures of § 102(b), and instead
depends on the fundamental principle of copyright law that independent
creation is never infringement"). Another way of putting it would be to say that
an identical copy is always infringing as long as it was copied from the
plaintiffs work, while an identical work is never infringing as long as it was not
copied from the plaintiffs work. Merger is only needed when we do not know
whether the identical work is a work or just a copy of one.
This approach's merits are illustrated by the shortcomings of an opinion that
did not use it-Judge Posner's, in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300
(7th Cir. 1983). In Gracen, the plaintiff had painted her impression of Dorothy
from The Wizard of Oz, based on stills from the MGM movie. She claimed the
defendant had plagiarized her painting, to which he admittedly had access. Id.
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theory at least, could be used to justify the literal copying of
works of imaginative literature and art. For much creative
writing, idea and expression are uniquely "merged" because
a different form of words would convey a different
meaning. 114 Likewise, a different set of lines, shapes, and
colors would make an artwork into a different aesthetic
experience. A simplistic application of the merger doctrine
could result in a policy that would perversely deny
protection to the most creative of works; to the contrary,
they are expressive precisely because their distinct
identities are inseparable from their "minutely
Appropriate
11 5
Words" or "minutely Appropriate Execution."
The problem is similar, although not identical, for
representational artworks when the artist's goal is accurate
portrayal of a natural or human-made thing, and the
116
constraint is the character of the thing being portrayed.
at 301-02. Judge Posner concluded that her painting was ineligible for
protection as a derivative work because it had effectively "merged" with the
stills (although he did not use this term), which made it impossible to tell

whether the defendant had copied her painting or copied her source material.
Id. at 304-05. He decided the case, however, without ever looking at the alleged
"piratical copy," which the defendant inexplicably had failed to produce. Id. at
301; see also Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments:
Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 6 (2001); Wiley Jr., supra note

102, at 137 (inferring that Bradford's plate indeed was a "piratical copy" of
Gracen's painting).
114. Wiley Jr., supra note 102, at 123:
In common usage, an idea is an intangible and abstract thought. But
an idea inevitably becomes a concrete expression as soon as a human
states it. That is, an idea cannot be defined or communicated to
another person without becoming an expression, a particular and
precise collection of meaningful symbols.
115. See BLAKE, supra note 94; cf. Cleanth Brooks, The Heresy of
Paraphrase,in THE WELL WROUGHT URN: STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY
182-85 (Reynal & Hitchcock 1947); Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy:
Copyright, Censorship,and Religious Pluralism, 91 CAL. L. REv. 323, 362 (2003)
('To a devotee of modern poetry. . . a paraphrase of T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land
simply will not do: the reader needs to engage the actual text. But it would be
perverse to conclude that, in the case of a highly original work sueh [sic] as
Eliot's poem, the merger doctrine strips the work of copyright protection.");
Shubha Ghosh, Legal Code and the Need for a Broader FunctionalityDoctrine
in Copyright, 50 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 71, 103 (2003) ("Since the idea of the
poem is equivalent to its expression... there [would be] no copyright in Keats's
Ode to a Grecian Urn.").
116. The semiotic distinction follows. In literary works, the "signified" (the
author's mental concept or idea) merges with its "signifier" (the form of words
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To the extent that the artist subordinates freely willed selfexpression to mimetic accuracy,
the portrait will tend to
"merge" with its subject. 117 The ideal sculpture of a Brillo
118
box, for example, would look exactly like a real Brillo box.
When the portrait is perfectly accurate, it will be
indiscernible from the thing it depicts, which is the conceit
of trompe l'oeil in traditional art as well as the
"simulacrum" or "virtual reality" in postmodern art. 119 If
the merger doctrine were to be indiscriminately applied in
the visual arts, such works, including many photographs
and works of photo-realism, would be ineligible for
copyright protection, which is not at all the case, although it
is the case that highly realistic pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works may not be protected much beyond literal
copying. 120
A. Kregos
Once more, Judge Alito's decision in Southco reflected
the boundaries imposed on copyright authorship by the
Scylla of rule-constraint and the Charybdis of functionality.
On one side, Southco's part numbers were generated by
chosen to express the idea), while in representational artworks, the "sign" (the
linguistic composite of sound-image and the mental concept it signifies) merges
with its "referent" (the non-linguistic object to which the sign refers). See
Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621,
633-38 (2004) (explaining linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure and
Charles Sanders Pierce).
117. Cf. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258,
1265 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying protection to digital car models that "depict
nothing more than unadorned Toyota vehicles-the car as car").
118. See MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART

59-105 (2003) (providing illustrations and examples).
119. To further complicate the picture, some contemporary artists play a
subversive shell game with works, objects, and copies, exploiting the viewer's
disorientation to critique the transformation of intangible artistic expressions
into tangible artistic commodities. See Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the
Claims of Art, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368, 396-97 (2002); Jeffrey Malkan, What is a
Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 419, 425-35 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the author of a jellyfish sculpture "may prevent others from copying the
original features he contributed, but he may not prevent others from copying
elements of expression that nature displays for all observers, or that the glassin-glass medium suggests to all sculptors). See also Murray, supra note 29, at
798-848 (collecting and critiquing visual arts cases).
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fixed numbering rules that left little or no discretion to
their authors. On the other, the numbering rules
themselves were determined by the practical requirements
of the coding process. Judge Alito's acknowledgment of
these limits on copyright echoed and extended Justice
Bradley's, in Baker v. Selden, one hundred twenty-five
years earlier. 121 Was there an alternative? In fact, yes. A
different approach had been taken in 1991 by Judge Jon
Newman in Kregos v. Associated Press.122 In Kregos, the
Second Circuit in its typically resourceful manner had
begun to explore the possibility of broadening the concept of
the compilation in a way that would insulate rule-based
the challenge of the doctrine that had evolved
works from 123
from Baker.
At issue in Kregos was the copyright claimed for a
baseball pitching form, a blank score sheet with spaces into
which Kregos could insert data about nine designated
categories of statistics belonging to the opposing pitchers in
a pending game. 124 The score sheet, once filled in, was
supposed to help the reader predict the outcome of the day's
contest. These facts, of course, summoned the specter of
Baker v. Selden, and the Associated Press's obvious defense
was that Kregos's copyright was precluded by the merger
doctrine as well as the blank form rule. 125 Specifically, the
blank pitching form was a literal element of Kregos's
system for picking the winners of baseball games, just as
the blank ledger page was a literal element of Selden's
method for keeping accounts. Since the system could not be
used without using the form, a copyright on the form would
impermissibly copyright the system as well.
The initial surprise about Judge Newman's opinion was

121. Justice Bradley said that systems cannot be protected by copyright, and
Judge Alito said that the products of systems cannot be protected by copyright.
See Baker v. Selden 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879); Southco Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,

390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).
122. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. See supra cases listed in note 12.
124. See 937 F.2d at 702-03. Samples of the forms themselves, as they had
appeared in newspapers, were reproduced in the district court's opinion, Kregos
v. Associated Press, 731 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part,
937 F.2d at 700.
125. On the blank form rule, see supra note 97.
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that he accepted Kregos's claim that the blank form was in
reality a compilation of data. 126 The term "compilation," in
other words, wasn't just a metaphor for the rule-based
expression in the score sheet, but rather was what the score
sheet actually was. This premise brought the case out from
under Baker's shadow. Ironically, it would have been a
stretch for Kregos to say that his score sheet was a data
compilation after he had filled in the blanks, although, at
that point, it would at least have been a non-random
sequence of numbers arranged on a page. The Second
Circuit, however, had recently rejected just such a claim in
Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investor's Service,
Financial
27
Inc.1
The forms in that case were "Daily Bond Cards," index
cards with five blank spaces for filling in information about
municipal bond redemptions. "The researchers had five
facts to fill in on each card," wrote the court, "nothing more
and nothing less.' 28 Since the researchers were "clerks
with no special skills who exercised no discretion in their
jobs," 129 the cards they filled in were not protectible as
compilations. If a "Daily Bond Card" with five filled-in data
points did not qualify for protection, one might reasonably
expect that a baseball score sheet with nine blank spaces
would be an even less worthy candidate.
The scales were tipped by Judge Newman in Kregos's
favor by his decision to forgo this reading of the Financial
Information case. 130 Beyond calling the score sheet a

126. This opened up a split with the Ninth Circuit, which one year earlier
had held that individual forms with blank spaces for categories of information
cannot be copyrighted as compilations. See Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys.,
Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).
127. 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 208.
129. Id. at 206.
130. Judge Newman justified his disagreement with the district court by
citing a case that predated Financial Information, 808 F.2d at 204, by two
years. In Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second
Circuit had held that a compilation of 5,000 "premium" baseball cards, out of a
universe of 18,000, was entitled to copyright protection. Id. at 863. Eckes had
selected approximately one out of every three and a half cards. Judge Newman
thought that Kregos's choice of nine pitching statistics out of a universe of
possibly twenty was close enough to Eckes to qualify for protection as well,
ignoring that Kregos had selected categories of facts rather than compiled facts,
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compilation, however, the court would still have to answer
the crucial question of what the copyrighted work was, and,
more to the point, what the author expressed. In order to
decide whether the merger doctrine applied, the Second
Circuit would first have to determine what was merging
with what. The wider the separation between "idea" and
"expression," the better the chances for Kregos's copyright
to survive. He needed to define the idea very generally and
the expression very specifically, and the Associated Press
had to do the opposite.
In particular, as in Southco, the battle would be over
where to draw the line between idea and expression, and
which side of the line the rule-basis would wind up on. In
addition, Kregos needed to show that his score sheet was
not merely a literal element of a system, as was the
arrangement of ruled lines and columns in Baker. Finally,
he would have to show that the nine categories he had
chosen were not entirely predetermined by the purpose his
work was meant to serve-that there was more than one
way of framing an outcome predictive score sheet, and that
other authors could make different creative choices.
The Associated Press claimed that Kregos's score sheets
were exactly like Selden's blank ledger pages.131 If they
were expressive at all, they only expressed his system for
predicting winners. To the extent that the constraints of
function made their design inevitable or nearly inevitable,
the scenes et faire version of the merger doctrine would
preclude copyright protection. Even if Kregos could have
chosen a different set of pitching statistics that would have
generated the same prediction, he would still have to
answer to the merger doctrine because his rule-basis was
and left blank spaces on his form in lieu of the facts themselves. See Kregos, 937
F.2d at 704. But Judge Newman's elision of the difference between facts and
factual categories reflected a more basic question about authorship that eluded
all the judges who looked at the FinancialInformation case. Was the author of
the bond cards the supervisor who had specified the five data points for the
cards or the clerks who each day entered new data on the cards? A similar
question bedeviled the Southco court, where the numbering rules and part
numbers were two dimensions of the same work, but were created by two
different authors.
131. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 713 (Sweet, J., dissenting in part). Indeed, one
of the two British cases cited in Baker v. Selden had expressly held that a blank
form for scoring cricket matches was ineligible for copyright protection. See
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1879).
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still a "system" under Baker v. Selden, and there was no
other way of expressing that system except through a score
sheet listing those nine categories.
Kregos responded that even though his score sheets
were useful to a wagering sports fan, they were also
informative and entertaining, like other news items on the
sports page. Although there may not have been much
reason to study the score sheets unless one were trying to
predict the winner of a baseball game (just as there was not
much reason to consult the ADA's Code on Dental
Proceduresand Nomenclature unless one were filling out an
insurance claim or a patient's dental record), they did not
themselves constitute a system for predicting winners
because they did not instruct the reader how to weigh the
nine categories. 132 In addition, Kregos argued that he could
have chosen a different rule-basis that would have
generated the same prediction, or at least that possibility
had not been eliminated. 133 As long as there is more than
one way of making a prediction, giving Kregos a monopoly

132. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706 (Newman, J., majority opinion). Cf.
Bookmakers' Afternoon Greyhound Serv., Ltd. v. Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire)
Ltd., [1994] F.S.R. 723 (Ch.), availableat 1994 WL 1061783. In Bookmakers'the
court considered whether race cards used to calculate the odds at greyhound
races were protectible. The race cards, like Kregos's score sheets, had blank
spaces for the player's statistics, but, unlike Kregos's score sheets, expressly
incorporated a formula that had to be applied to the day's races for every
contest. The court held (or rather opined) that the rule-basis for calculating the
odds (or "forecast dividends") was protectible because "thought, labor, and skill
went into its derivation" and it had been continuously refined since its
inception. Id. at 734. The plaintiff was not claiming infringement of the
formula, however, but infringement of the forecast dividends themselves,
produced at the end of each racing day. Hence, as in Southco, protection was not
claimed for the rule-based process, but rather for the numbers produced by the
process.
As did the Third Circuit in Southco, the judge in the Bookmakers' case
rejected this claim:
I have already indicated that I do not believe that once the formula was
derived, sufficient skill, labour and judgment is used when calculating
the dividends from the starting prices supplied to acquire copyright. It
is a repetitive job requiring a certain amount of education and
thereafter a meagre amount of labour. Further I cannot believe that
the person who, day after day, year after year, does the calculation is
producing what the statute calls "an original literary work."
Id. at 736.
133. See Kregos, 731 F. Supp. at 119.
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on his system of picking winners through a copyright on his
score sheets would be no more contrary to the principles of
copyright than giving any author a monopoly on any other
work of authorship.
B. What a Work of Authorship Is
The debate in Kregos between Judge Newman and
Judge Sweet (in dissent) over whether the score sheet was
protectible-whether, that is, Kregos's idea had merged
with his expression-took the same track that Judge Alito
and Judge Roth would repeat more than a decade later in
Southco, although the roles of winner and loser in the
Second Circuit would be reversed in the Third. What was
troubling about both these decisions was not that the
results were doctrinally indeterminate, as they often are in
close cases, but that the debates between the prevailing and
dissenting judges in both Kregos and Southco were so
detached from any author's concept of what a work of
authorship is.
In arguing for or against the copyright plaintiff, all of
the lawyers and judges in the two cases did what lawyers
are trained to do with texts: they proposed broad or narrow
interpretations of their meanings. The work in question
was laid on the examining table as if it were a judicial
opinion being dissected for its precedential value, and the
task was to extract a holding. In legal analysis, a broad
interpretation of the holding means that the precedent case
will cover many possible future cases, while a narrow
interpretation means that it will apply to very few, or
maybe none. The narrowest, most case-specific holding
"merges" the facts of the precedent case with its rule; the
case will have no progeny because it is one of a kind.
The copyright of a work of authorship is like the
holding of a case. A copyright, like a holding, can be broad
or narrow. The plaintiff in an infringement action will
attempt to construct a broad enough "holding" for his or her
work so that the scope of its copyright will encompass as
many similar and potentially infringing works as possible,
without being so broad that the copied elements wind up on
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the "idea"--or public domain-side of the line. 134 The
defendant, on the other hand, will argue for a narrow
"holding" of the copyrighted work so that even a very
similar work will be found non-infringing as long as its
expressive elements are non-identical. 135 In a merger
defense, the defendant will go further and claim that even
an identical copy would be non-infringing because the
singularity of the work's "idea" allows for only one form of
expression, while the plaintiff must respond that the
copyright extends at least to identical copies of the work
because the "idea" behind it could have been realized in
more than one literal form.
If the work's idea in Kregos was something so broad as
the notion that pitching statistics could be relevant to
predicting winners, or, in Southco, that serial numbers
could be devised that would encode the characteristics of
screws and fasteners, then the expression of those ideas in
the form of any given score sheet or any given part number
would be immune from the merger doctrine. If, on the other
hand, the work's idea in Kregos was a particularsystem for
predicting winners or, in Southco, a particular coding
process, then the expression of those ideas in the form of
Kregos's score sheets or Southco's part numbers could be
seen as an inevitable byproduct of the system's use, which
would preclude copyright protection.
The procession of judges who have made a practice of
reading works of authorship this way goes all the way back
to Nichols because that is what Judge Hand was doing in

134. Likewise, patent claims may be drafted broadly to give the patent
wider effect, or narrowly to avoid the prior art. See 69 C.J.S. Patents § 287
(2003). The difference is that a patent, unlike a copyright, is a separate text
that makes claims about the invention; it is the patent that is broadly or
narrowly construed, not the invention itself.
135. To be more specific about my analogy, the equivalent in a judicial
opinion of an "idea" is a basic legal principle or black letter rule; such ideas
doctrinally inform the opinion, but are not to be confused with its case-specific
point of law, or holding. Readers of a judicial opinion can interpret the holding
on different levels of abstraction because the holding is an "expression" of what
the case means. At a sufficiently high level of abstraction, the holding becomes
a new rule of law, i.e., an "idea," that will be widely applicable to future cases.
Put differently, the black letter rules in a case are Professor Weinreb's "abstract
ideas" and its holdings "concrete ideas." See supra note 51. Holdings are part of
the case, just as concrete ideas are part of the work, while black letter rules
may be present in the opinion, but are not products of the opinion.
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that case-demonstrating that Abie's Irish Rose could be
assigned a broad or a narrow holding and construed broadly
as a comedic variant of the Romeo and Juliet motif, which
would put the plot on the "idea" side of the line, or narrowly
as a contemporary urban drama, which would put it on the
"expression" side. This practice of constructing broad and
narrow holdings for literary works is reasonably effective
when the project is to compare two works in an
infringement
claim because
such a work-to-work
comparison requires a type of analogical reasoning to
determine whether any similarities between the two works
are legally relevant.
It also resonates with the notion that expression comes
from unique images and distinctive words rather than from
general statements and abstract ideas. 136 It is of dubious
value, however, in a case like Southco, where the scrutiny of
a single work must determine whether it is eligible for
copyright protection in the first place, and where the
assessment of how to draw the line between idea and
expression in the challenged work is unchecked by the
practical consideration of whether one work can serve as a
market substitute for the other. 137
C. CCC Information Services
Neither Judge Alito in Southco nor Judge Newman in
Kregos was inclined to look too deeply into the question of
what is expressive about the description of a screw or
fastener in the form of a part number, or advice to the
reader about how to pick a winner in the form of nine

136. See JOHN DEWEY, ART As EXPERIENCE 90-91 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1958)
(1934) ('There is [a] great difference between expression and statement. The
latter is generalized. An intellectual statement is valuable in the degree in
which it conducts the mind to many things all of the same kind. It is effective in
the extent to which, like an even pavement, it transports us easily to many
places. The meaning of an expressive object, on the contrary, is individualized..
It has a local habitation.").
137. Market substitution is the economic rationale for why courts must
apply the "substantial similarity" standard in the context of whether a potential

consumer (the "average lay observer" or "intended audience") can discern a
meaningful resemblance between the protected work and the offending one. See,
e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Dawson v. Hinshaw
Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1990).
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unembellished data points. 138 The low threshold for
copyright authorship springs to the rescue when the
expressive and the functional come uncomfortably close to
converging, as they did in these two cases. This is why the
key consideration for the Second Circuit in Kregos (as it
would be for the Third Circuit in Southco, with different but
analogous facts) was not simply whether the score sheets
were components of a system under Baker v. Selden, but
whether a system for predicting winners had predetermined
the nine categories Kregos selected for his score 139sheets,
leaving him with no freely willed expressive choices.
In Kregos, Judge Newman concluded that the answer to
this question was no. 140 By chance, another Second Circuit
panel was at the very same time considering a similar
"score sheet" case, and delivered its opinion two days later.
The decision went the opposite way, but was consistent
with Kregos. In Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red
Apple, Inc., 141 the Second Circuit was presented with a
compilation of statistics, designed to help gamblers pick
winning numbers at local race tracks, which had been
copied and published by a competitor without permission.
Lalli's copyrighted works, the "Brooklyn Handle" and the
"3-5-7 Old Way," were forms that contained blank spaces
for inserting information about the total sum of money
wagered on horse races in New York on a given day. Each of
these charts or score sheets embodied a formula for
generating a lucky number from the raw betting
statistics. 142 The authorship claim was based on Lalli's

of many low authorship
138. "Personality-based characterizations
informational works seem contrived," wrote Professor Ginsburg, in an article
published shortly before the Feist case was decided. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation
and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90
importantly, these
COLUM. L. REV. 1865,
1868-69 (1990). 'More
characterizations seem wholly beside the point. Even if one could discern
subjective 'arrangement' in works such as maps, address directories, and
compilations of judicial decisions, that arrangement may bear little, if any,
connection to the work's central importance as a source of information." Id.
139. Compare Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1991),
with Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2001).
140. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704.
141. 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Kregos was decided on June
11, and Victor Lalli Enters. on June 13.
142. Id. at 672-73.
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culling of data from newspapers and other sources, placing
it on the chart, and applying a formula to calculate lucky
numbers. The court held that this rearrangement of factual
data on a functional grid, to which a fixed rule-basis was
mechanically applied, offered no opportunity for variation
and therefore did not satisfy the Feist standard of
143
originality.
Three years later, in CCC Information Services v.
Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,144 a similar situation
came up yet again in the Second Circuit, and Judge Pierre
Leval answered the copyright question again the same way,
by focusing on whether the work's rule-basis had
predetermined the author's form of expression. The rulebased work this time was a book of used car valuations
called the "Red Book," published by Maclean Hunter eight
times a year, which covered a wide variety of car models
sold in different regions of the country. The defendant,
CCC, had incorporated the Red Book's valuations into its
database without permission. Maclean Hunter sued CCC,
claiming that its copyright on the Red Book had been
infringed.145
The question in the case was not just whether the
compilation as a whole, the Red Book, was eligible for
copyright (the Second Circuit's answer was an unequivocal
yes), 146 but whether the individual price numbers were as
well. CCC argued, and the district court had agreed, that
the price numbers were "ideas" that merged with Maclean
Hunter's expression of them since they could only be
143. See id. at 673.
144. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 63-64.
146. Id. at 67 ('We find that the selection and arrangement of data in the
Red Book displayed amply sufficient originality to pass the low threshold
requirement to earn copyright protection."). Similarly, the Third Circuit in
Southco applied this low threshold requirement to "Handbooks" in which the

part numbers were compiled, see Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco 1),
258 F.3d 148, 150 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001), but the Sixth Circuit in ATC did not do
likewise. Compare Southco I, 258 F.3d at 148, and Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge,
Corp. (Southco II), 324 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003), with ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v.
Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir.
2005) ("To be sure, ATC could have arranged the parts information in other
ways that were potentially less clear or useful, but this fact alone is insufficient
to demonstrate the creativity necessary for copyright protection."). See also
supra note 36.
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expressed in one way, or, alternatively, "facts" about the
market value of used cars that could not be owned by
anyone under the guise of copyright, 147 while Maclean
Hunter responded that the price numbers were not ideas or
facts but "approximative statements of opinion by the Red
Book editors."'148 This disagreement raised the same
concern that Judge Alito would focus on in Southco--how
were the numbers generated? Were they the mechanical
products of a numbering system, or were they products of
149
an author's freely willed self-expression?
Judge Leval found that they were the latter. Although
Maclean Hunter's appraisal process involved fifteen
predetermined factors, the factors did not devolve into a
system because there was no formula for how to combine
them. 150 The price numbers, accordingly, were "neither
reports of historical prices nor mechanical derivations of
historical prices or other data."'' 1 Moreover, that they were
"expressed in numerical form" was "immaterial to
originality."'152 Even if a price number could be
characterized as Maclean Hunter's idea of how much a
particular used car was worth,153
this type of idea would lie on
the expression side of the line.
In the most memorable part of his opinion in CCC
Information Services, Judge Leval distinguished between
"building block" ideas and "soft" ideas, suggesting that the
building block type should be denied copyright protection,
147. 44 F.3d at 64.
148. Id. at 72.
149. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
150. 44 F.3d at 67.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 67 n.6.
153. Five years later, the Ninth Circuit expressly relied on CCC Info. Servs.
in a case that involved price estimates for collectible coins. See CDN Inc. v.
Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). In familiar rhetoric, the court
characterized the individual coin prices as "compilations of data," and concluded
that, like the car values in CCC Info. Servs., they "fall on the expression side of
the line." Id. at 1260, 1262. The court did not fully explain its reasoning, but
perhaps thought that if any work of authorship can be metaphorically
decomposed into a compilation of unprotectible elements, then any single
element of a compilation (such as an individual price estimate) might be further

decomposed into a compilation of the bits of information that went into making
it. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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while the soft type, "infused with taste or opinion," should
be protected. 5 4 The basis for this distinction, which Judge
Leval ascribed to Judge Newman, was in part that building
block ideas, "directed to the understanding of phenomena or
the solving of problems," were far too important to slip into
private ownership, while "those that merely represent the
author's taste or opinion and therefore do not materially
assist the understanding of future thinkers" could be taken
out of the public domain without "inflict[ing] serious injury
on the policy . . . that forbids granting protection to an
55
idea."1
Just because building block ideas are valuable to the
public, however, does not mean that the public should have
them for free. 156 The more convincing rationale for Judge
Leval's distinction is that building block ideas are
components of systems that can be applied by any user to
achieve a predetermined result. 157 In contrast, "soft ideas"

154. See CCCInfo. Servs., 44 F.3d at 71-72.
155. Id. at 71.
156. In Kregos, for instance, Judge Newman gave the example of "a doctor
who publishes a list of symptoms that he believes provides a helpful diagnosis
of a disease." Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
Whether such a diagnostic tool could be protectible should not depend on
whether it contains "building block" ideas about the disease, but instead on
whether it provides a technique for generating a diagnosis, in which case it
would be considered a "process" or "system" and fall under the rule of Baker v.
Selden. The text that described the technique, however, would still be
protectible.
157. The Eleventh Circuit, like the Third, has adopted something close to a
per se rule that a copyright claim cannot be enforced if the infringed work
includes an express formula or "system" for converting its unprocessed data into
refined data, predictions, or other useful information. In Warren Publ'g., Inc. v.
Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997), the court, on a rehearing
en banc, denied copyright protection to a "Factbook" that contained "1,340 pages
of factual data on 8,413 cable systems throughout the country and their
owners." Id. at 1511.
The key to the outcome of the case was this statement by the trial judge:
"Warren has developed a system for selecting communities which is original in
the industry. This selection process represents a part of the format of the
compilation which is copyrightable."' Id. at 1516 (quoting district court's ruling,
emphasis added by appellate court). Judge Birch held that the trial judge, if
correct in his finding of fact, was wrong in his conclusion of law. "If Warren
actually does employ a system to select the communities to be represented in
the book, then section 102(b) of the.Act bars the protection of such a system."
Id. at 1517.
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do not arise from any formula or lead to any determinate
outcome. Maclean Hunter's valuations were soft ideas
because they "explain[ed] nothing, and describe[d] no
method, process or procedure."'158 Maclean Hunter made no
attempt "to monopolize the basis of its economic forecasting
or the factors that it weighs; the Red Book's entries are no
more than the predictions of Red Book editors 59of used car
values for six weeks on a rough regional basis."'1
D. NYMEX
The most recent skirmish over copyright for rulebased expression is consistent with this suggested
rationale, although the plaintiff did not prevail this time.
On August 1, 2007, the Second Circuit handed down its
opinion in New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange,Inc.,160 a case that dealt with the
settlement prices for open futures contracts that are
161
calculated by NYMEX at the end of each business day.
NYMEX claimed that each individual settlement price was
eligible for copyright as an original work of authorship,
which was just like Southco's claim for each individual part
In dissent, Judge Godbold argued that the trial judge's use of the word
"system" was imprecise, and, in any event, did not necessarily preclude
protection for the book, if the author's "idea" of selecting and arranging data in
a functional manner was expressed in a sufficiently original form. Id. at 1530.
He could have gone on to say that the book's rule-basis, i.e., its rules for
selection, coordination, and arrangement, looked like a "system" only because
they could have been used to replicate essentially the same book. The author of
any compilation, however, has the right to prevent others from applying his or
her rule-basis to the same raw data for the purpose of creating a competing
work.
158. 44 F.3d at 73.
159. Id.
160. 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
161. NYMEX's proprietary interest was time-sensitive, i.e., the settlement
prices were not only facts but news. "[B]etween the time of creating the prices
and the required public disclosure the following day, NYMEX supplies them to
market data vendors such as Reuters pursuant to license agreements. These
vendors then disclose the prices to their subscribers." Id. at 112. For an
argument that misappropriation could have provided a remedy that would have
better suited NYMEX's injury, see generally Jeremy V. Murray, Note, The Death
of Copyright Protection in Individual Price Valuations, a Flawed Merger
Doctrine, and FinancialMarket Manipulation: New York Mercantile Exchange
v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 57 BUFF. L. REV. 279 (2009).
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number. 16 2 From the perspective of intracircuit precedent,
the issue was whether the NYMEX case was on-point with
CCC Information Services-that is, whether NYMEX's
settlement prices were directly analogous to Maclean
Hunter's used car valuations. If so, then stare decisis would
require that NYMEX's settlement prices be copyrightprotected as were Maclean Hunter's used car valuations.
The facts of NYMEX left ample room for the Second
Circuit to distinguish it from CCC Information Services.
The court went further, however, and not only
distinguished CCC Information Services, but came close to
overruling it by relegating Judge Leval's entire discussion
of originality to dicta.163 The most obvious distinction
between NYMEX and CCC Information Services was that
NYMEX's settlement prices were binding on the brokers
and customers who did business on the exchange, while
Maclean Hunter's car valuations were not binding on
anyone. 164 Hence the settlement prices were immutable
facts stated in numerical form, in contrast to Maclean
Hunter's car valuations, which were merely opinions about

162. "In March 2002, NYMEX sought a copyright for its database including
the settlement prices. After the Copyright Office informed NYMEX that it was
unwilling to provide a copyright in settlement prices, NYMEX filed a

replacement application and obtained a copyright for its database only." N.Y.
MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 112. In other words, NYMEX's compilation of
data was registered, but not the internal data points (the individual settlement
prices). The ensuing complaint, however, was based on the defendant's (ICE's)
copying of the individual settlement prices-which ICE had been forwarding to
the London Clearing House that cleared its customers' trades-not on the
copying of NYMEX's database as a whole. Id.
163. In his NYMEX opinion, Judge Katzmann observed that Maclean
Hunter's Red Book was protected as a compilation of data, and the whole book
had been copied in CCC's database; hence "it was not necessary [for the court in
CCC Info. Servs.] to also hold that the individual estimates were copyrightable."
Id. at 115 n.5.
164. While NYMEX now argues that settlement prices are merely
opinion, we note that NYMEX itself treats the prices as news of
the day. Within minutes of determining the settlement prices it
disseminates them to its internal Clearing House. In turn, the
Clearing Members calculate customers' margins based on the
settlement prices. NYMEX also provides the prices to newspapers
which publish them alongside other market facts. All customers
with NYMEX accounts are bound by NYMEX's calculation.
Id. at 115 n.6.
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the price that a used car might or should fetch. 165 The
copyright
merger of fact and expression would preclude
166
protection in the former case, but not the latter.
Apart from the merger doctrine, the court touched
upon various additional justifications, both explicit and
implicit, for finding that NYMEX's settlement prices were
not the product of freely willed self-expression, including
the words and short phrases regulation that had been
inconclusively debated in the Southco case. 167 One was that
165. This, even though state regulations required insurance companies to
use CCC's Red Book, or an average of the Red Book and Bluebook estimates
("unless another approved valuation method is employed"), to calculate
payments due the insured upon total loss of a vehicle. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc.
v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second
Circuit had ruled that this legal reference to an extrinsic standard did not
convert it from an opinion into a fact. See id. at 73-74.
166. See NY Mercantile Exch., 497 F.3d at 116-17. The Second Circuit
could have applied the rationale of the Fifth Circuit's Veeck opinion here. See
supra text accompanying note 99. The argument would be that NYMEX's
settlement prices were analogous to the model codes in Veeck. A model code
differs from a municipal ordinance-even if the text of the two is exactly the
same-because legislative enactment of a model code transforms a mere opinion
of what the law should be into the fact of what the law is.
As stated by the trial judge in NYMEX, the merger doctrine's application
was just as straightforward as it had been in Veeck, if not more so. Since there
is only one way to express the "fact" or "idea" of a NYMEX settlement price-a
single number which is the actual price at which a futures contract must be
settled-the idea of a NYMEX settlement price "merges" with its numerical
expression. See N. Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 112.13.
The Second Circuit affirmed this holding, which was correct, but muddled
the analysis. Judge Katzmann focused on the "range of possible expressions" for
a settlement price and found that "[b]ecause any settlement price for a
particular futures contract would be based on the same underlying market
facts, any dissension would be exceptionally narrow." Id. at 117-18. He
concluded that the merger doctrine must therefore be applied because copyright
protection would prevent NYMEX's competitors from independently valuing
NYMEX's contracts. Id. at 118.
This would be a valid rationale for limiting the scope of NYMEX's copyright
protection to the actual settlement price, but it is not a valid rationale for
applying the merger doctrine to deny protection altogether. Under the principle
of independent creation, a competitor who arrived at exactly the same
settlement price as NYMEX would be held innocent of copyright infringement
as long as it could establish that it did not copy NYMEX's work. See supra note
107 and accompanying text.
167. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 113; cf. ATC Distrib. Group,
Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 710-11 (6th
Cir. 2005). See supranote 19 for how the issue was addressed in Southco.
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"NYMEX is required by law to record settlement prices, and
it does not challenge the legality of that rule."' 6 8 The court
applied the rationale that NYMEX needed no copyright
incentive to author its settlement prices, 169 but failed to
point out that the Supreme Court's ruling in Feist might
actually dictate that protection be denied whenever the
rule-basis for70 generating or selecting data is a legal
requirement.
An even better justification was that NYMEX's
settlement prices for the vast majority of its futures
contracts-that is, those due for delivery in high-volume
months-are based on a predetermined formula, "a
weighted average of all trades done within the closing
range."' 71 The NYMEX court did not cite Judge Alito's
168. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 118.
169. Id.
170. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991)
("one could plausibly conclude that this selection was dictated by state law, not
by Rural"); see also Sinai v. Bureau of Auto. Repair, No. C-92-0274-VRW, 1992
WL 470699, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1992) (denying infringement claim for
automotive chart that listed the equipment required by state emission control
laws); Tastefully Simple, Inc. v. Two Sisters Gourmet, L.L.C., 134 F. App'x. 1, 5
(6th Cir. 2005) (same for spreadsheet that alphabetically listed sales tax rates,
and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of state tax departments).
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has been hesitant to deny copyright
protection for materials that are authored to comply with a legal requirement,
as long as the legal rule-basis does not entirely foreclose authorial discretion. In
Bucklew, Judge Posner observed:
If Bucklew were claiming copyright in the tabular
presentation of the summary data required by HUD, this case
would be governed by Baker v. Selden. But he is not. He is
claiming copyright in tables configured in an optional way,
tables that are the product of format choices that are not
unavoidable ....
Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2003).
Likewise, in Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1993), the
Seventh Circuit reinstated an infringement claim that was based on the copying
of real estate title reports-in essence, boilerplate forms filled in with factual
information required by law--over the defendant's objection that "[t]here is no
room for creative choice . . . when all title examiners must cover the same

ground and the examiner has a duty to make a diligent search of, and include in
the commitment, all information bearing on the parcel."
171. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 111. NYMEX's rules provide
that its Settlement Price Committee is authorized to override the mathematical
formula; NYMEX argued that this authority represented a measure of authorial
discretion that rescued the settlement price as a work of authorship. See id. at
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Southco opinion, but Judge Alito's rationale could have
been usefully summoned here: that unless NYMEX's
mathematical rule-basis for formulating the settlement
prices itself was copyright-protected (which it was not,
under Baker v. Selden), then the data generated by
the rule-basis could not be copyrightmechanically applying
172
protected either.
This rationale is also why-as well as how-CCC
Information Services can be reconciled with Southco. In
Southco, the part numbers were the products of a system.
Anyone using Southco's system would come up with exactly
the same number for a given part. That was the only
rationale for denying protection to Southco's part numbers
because, certainly, a part number is not a "building block"
idea, nor is it an invariant fact of nature or history. Even if
a Kanebridge part had been designed to be interchangeable
with a Southco part, and it would have been beneficial for
Kanebridge and its customers to be able to identify the two
matching parts, there would be no basis in copyright law for
allowing Kanebridge to copy Southco's part numbers unless
not in the first place protected as works of
they were 173
authorship.
120-21 (Hall, J., concurring in part). Judge Katzmann, however, did not
comment about the override provision, beyond noting that the frequency of its
use was disputed. Id. at 112 (majority opinion). As for the "low volume months,"
the extent of NYMEX's "creative judgment" was also disputed, but ICE (the
defendant) contended that,
there is little judgment involved because the subcommittees only
review "objective market data," and, in practice, 'look at settlement
prices for the near month contracts-i.e., those that are determined by
mathematical formula-and then extrapolate to determine the
remainder of the settlement prices based on the changes in the monthto-month spread relationships in the various contracts compared to the
previous day."
Id. at 111.
172. Cf. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (validating patent for "the transformation of data,
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price").
173. It is possible, of course that copying the individual numbers could have
been justified as a fair use. Also, a decision limiting the scope of Southco's
copyright might have been tempered by other policy considerations. "[T]hese
manufacturers are not competitors in the sale of catalogs, but rather in the sale
of machine parts.... Denying copyright protection for parts numbering systems
promotes robust competition in the market for machine parts." Pamela
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In contrast,
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Circuit in both

CCC

Information Services and Kregos expressly held that there
was no system behind either Maclean Hunter's Red Book or
Kregos's score sheets. What was missing from both works
was a rule-basis that would crystallize the data supplied by
the author into a system and automatically generate the
price of a used car or the winner of a baseball game. One
could certainly wonder, of course, how much room for nonsystematic judgment was to be had after "x" number of
categories of information had been selected and arranged by
the author and presented to the reader for a defined
purpose. This, however, was how the Second Circuit left
it.174

III. FREELY WILLED SELF-EXPRESSION
In variety theaters I have often watched, before my turn came on,
a couple of acrobats performing on trapezes high in the roof. They
Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processesfrom the Scope
of its Protection,85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1975 n.351 (2007).
Twenty years earlier, Judge Becker himself had made much the same point
in a misappropriation case, in which the U.S. Golf Association had sued a
competitor who was using its numerical formula for calculating golfers'
handicaps:
Although the plaintiffs spend some time and effort updating their
formulas, and also compute results by means of their formulas, the
primary value of the results produced are not their inherent value in
performing the underlying functions, but rather in the fact that they
enable the public to discuss the underlying matters ...

by means of a

common set of terms.
U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037 (3d
Cir. 1984). In addition, he noted, 'The U.S.G.A. is not in the business of selling
handicaps to golfers, but is primarily interested in the promotion of the game of
golf, and in its own position as the governing body of amateur golf." Id. at 1038.
174. In fact, this was not exactly how the Second Circuit left it, at least in
the Kregos case. On remand, the district court once again granted the AP's
motion for summary judgment, see Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp.
1325, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), but, on Kregos's appeal of the post-remand
dismissal, the Second Circuit this time affirmed the district court, holding that
Kregos's form had virtually no protection beyond verbatim copying because of
the narrow range of creative options available for drafting an outcome
predictive score sheet. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993).
"As we suspected in Kregos II," wrote Judge George C. Pratt, referring to Judge
Newman's opinion, "much of the similarity between the AP and Kregos forms is
necessitated because there are a limited number of statistics generally
considered outcome-predictive by those familiar with the sport." Id. at 664.
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swung themselves, they rocked to and fro, they sprang into the air,
they floated into each other's arms, one hung by the hair from the
teeth of the other. "And that too is human freedom," I thought,
"self-controlled movement." What a mockery of holy Mother
Nature! Were the apes to see such a spectacle, no theater walls
could stand the shock of their laughter. 175

Kafka's story describes the aesthetic paradox lingering
in the background of the doctrinal debate over rule-based
expression. Nothing appears more freely willed than
arbitrary choice, and Kafka's acrobats hurtling through the
air seem to be free from all constraints, including the force
of gravity. The truth, however, is that the acrobats are more
constrained than anyone else in the theater. Their "selfcontrolled movement," or freely willed self-expression, is a
carefully orchestrated imitation of flight rather than flight
itself. An ape, even from within the confined space of his
cage, would laugh at the spectacle of the acrobats whose
every movement is timed and executed with split-second
precision to avert the consequences of falling to the ground.
The concept of rule-based expression in copyright law
requires that we give some thought to a theme that is
played out with great fanfare in other areas of law, most
notably torts and criminal law, 176 but not so often
considered in the context of copyright authorship. When
copyright searches a work of authorship for self-expression,
it presumes that expression must be freely willed and
formally realized, not coerced or predetermined by
authority or circumstances. 177 The author is the source of
the work and the sole cause for its creation. If the author's
175. FRANZ KAFKA, A Report to an Academy, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 250,
253 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1988)
(1983).

176. In both these areas, the elements of a cause of action or crime include
an intent or mens rea requirement (the defendant must have exercised some
degree of free will) and a causation requirement (the harmful consequences
must not have been determined by causes other than the defendant's conduct).
177. As Locke is the philosopher most closely associated with natural
rights based on labor, Hegel is most closely associated with natural
rights based on personality. Hegel viewed property as a necessary
expression of human 'will'; by marking external objects as "mine,"
the will expresses its individuality and freedom. One way in which
the will 'occupies' external objects is by giving them form.
Durham, supra note 105, at 610-11.
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choice of words, numbers, notes, lines, colors, or shapes is
entirely controlled by the requirements of a preexisting
system or formula, or by the nature of the work's subject
matter, then the author is not truly an178author, but rather a
clerk, a scribe, an artisan, or a copyist.
A. The Creativity Question
As Kafka's story illustrates, however, the appearance of
free flight is merely a circus act that is put on by the
acrobats to please the naive spectators, and one that is
laughable to the knowing and cynical apes. Every form of
self-expression takes place against the resistance of an
intractable medium or an obdurate reader. An author's selfexpression depends on how he or she manages the tension
between what is internally self-motivated and externally
imposed. Without this tension, there would be no need or
opportunity for self-expression. 1 79 If, for example, a baseball
player decided to break from convention by circling
aimlessly around the bases, he might think he was
expressing himself more freely than if he had waited until
the ball was pitched to him and he'd hit it, but in that case
he would just be running in circles rather than playing
baseball, and he would not be considered free, but crazy.

178. I am not considering here the legal fiction known as the "work made for
hire" doctrine, under which an employer is deemed to have authored an
employee's writings. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited:
Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE
L.J. 186, 248-264 (2008) (critiquing romantic authorship model); Catherine L.
Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-HireDoctrine, 15 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 11-56 (2003) (describing nineteenth century developments); Justin
Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual
Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 149-161 (1998) (discussing the
equivocal role of author's intention in the context of commissioned works).
179. "In a finished world," wrote John Dewey, "sleep and waking could not
be distinguished." DEWEY, supra note 130, at 17. Stanley Fish would "put the
matter as simply as possible" and say that
[i]n such a world communication itself would be beside the point, since
the circuit of knowledge would always and already be established and
no one would be outside it; there would be no gap to be bridged, no
secret to be revealed, no message to be completed. No one would speak
in order either to inform or persuade another, because every other
would already know what you know and be where you are.
STANLEY FISH, How MILTON WORKS 495.(2001).
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The rule-based performances of athletes, actors, and
musicians do not trouble us with questions about
determinism and free will because they do not result in
works of authorship. 18 0 Southco's coding process, in
contrast, raised exactly those questions for the obvious
reason that Southco claimed to be the author of its part
numbers, even though the literal form of those numbers
was predetermined by its numbering rules.
81
Since Baker v. Selden, and no doubt long before that,
the premise that a work consists of a literal dimension
sustained by a non-literal one has been the foundation of
copyright law's theory of authorship.18 2 This relationship,
however, has never been entirely understood, either by
literary scholars or copyright lawyers. In 1879, the very
year of the Baker decision, Eaton S. Drone's attempt to
explain what gives a work of authorship its unique identity
ended with a curious aside about the Bible, which he
implied was the exalted prototype of all works of authorship
in its mysterious union of the literal and the non-literal:
There can ...

be no property in a production of the mind unless it

is expressed in a definite order of words. But the property is not in
the mere words alone,-not alone in the one form of expression
chosen by the author. It is in the intellectual creation, which
language is merely a means of expressing and communicating....
The means of communication are manifold; but the invisible,

180. An actor's non-improvisatory performance will realize a literary work,
and a musician's a musical one. But neither is, by virtue of the work's
performance, its author. The written score of Gustav Mahler's Fourth
Symphony and Claudio Abbado's performance of it, for instance, are equally
literal realizations of the same musical work, but Mahler is the work's author,
not Abbado.
181. See, e.g., AUGUSTINE BIRRELL,

SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND

HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 167 (1899) ("Ideas, it has always been

admitted, even by the Stationers' Company, are as free as air. If you happen to
have any, you fling them into the common stock, and ought to be well content to
see your poorer brethren thriving upon them.").
182. The exception that proves the rule is Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), a case that
involved a book of 6,325 "coined" or nonsense words that could be used as a
secret code by telegraph operators, who would assign private meanings to the
meaningless words. 'These words," wrote Judge Hand, "have a prospective
meaning, but as yet they have not received, it, like an empty pitcher." Id. at
718. The "work" in Reiss was the rare instance of one that had no non-literal
dimension, or at least none supplied by the author, which is exactly why it was
unintelligible and useful for its intended purpose.
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intangible, incorporeal creation of the author's brain never loses
its identity. The Bible has been translated into all tongues; but its
truths, its eloquence, its poetry, have been the same to all
nations. 183

The mystery is how the work becomes an "intellectual
creation" distinct from both the literal sequence of its words
and its non-literal meaning, or, put differently, how the
work's form and content instantiate each other to produce
something that is dependent on both, but different from
either. 8 4 On one hand, the non-literal dimension of a work
determines whatever appears on the literal, and hence
constrains the author, while on the other, the non-literal
dimension makes possible what appears on the literal, and
hence enables the author. The author, whose originality is
the sine qua non of copyright protection, l s 5 presides over
the process that transforms idea into expression.
To say that the author is the origin of the work, though,
defers rather than answers the creativity question-that
question being, what the author does between idea and
expression. 86 Every act of authorship could be described as
183. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 97-98 (1879). Cf.
Bracha, supra note 172, at 228 (contending that the need to protect derivative
works, such as translations, encouraged nineteenth century jurists to adopt "the
modern notion of the work as a shape-shifter, an elusive intellectual entity that
could assume an infinite variety of concrete forms").
184. In Ernest J. Weinrib's words:
Form and content are correlative and interpenetrating. If any content
were formless it would lack the very determinateness which makes it
possible to experience it as a something, and it would therefore be, so
far as we are concerned, an indeterminate something or other that is
nothing in particular. If a form, on the other hand, were without
content, it would not be a form of anything and therefore not a form at
all. Form therefore is content and content form, with the distinction
between them being notional, not ontological.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 959 (1988).
185. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
186. Cf. Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation:
A Searchfor the Minimal Creativity Standardin Copyright Law, 82 DENV. U. L.
REV. 259, 270-80 (2004) (assessing relevance of human psychology and
neurobiology); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1949-70
(2006) (comparing theological and secular perspectives on creativity); Jessica
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a rule-based performance in some sense, but clearly not
every rule-based performance creates--or even realizes-a
work of authorship. Once more, a game provides the classic
example. A game must be played by the game's rules or it
isn't a game, but a brawl; and a player is a type of
performer who is constrained by the game's rules, but not
mechanically so. Nevertheless, game players are not
authors, 187 nor are their performances the realization of
works.188
B. A Non-Literal Stratum of Ideas
Why isn't a game a type of work? A game-like a coding
process-requires a fixed rule-basis. Rules are instructions
for how to play. Players, however, do not realize the game's
rules in the form of a game, but implement those rules in
order to win the game. 8 9 This is why verbal or pictorial
depictions of a particular game may be protectible, as may
be the textual form of the game's rules, but not the game
itself. In contrast, Southco's coding process enabled a user
of its numbering rules to realize a non-literal stratum of
ideas-messages, structures, and functions-in the textual
form of a part number. This made it seem like the person

Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L.J. 965, 1007-12 (1990) (describing
conscious and subconscious creative processes); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking
Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 824-45 (1993) (dealing with cognitive
science and psychiatry). But see Dennis Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 189 (2008) (denying that creativity was an issue in
Southco).
187. The player's participation in a videogame, for example, does not detract
from the programmer's authorship of the underlying software, let alone make
the player a co-author of the audiovisual work generated by the software. See
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). But see
W. Joss Nichols, Painting Through the Pixels: The Case for a Copyright in
Videogame Play, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 128 (2006) ("[A]s a user's
interaction increases, gaming becomes more akin to writing a game rather than
playing it.").
188. See Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 616-17
(9th Cir. 1996) (playing a game is not a public performance of the game's rules).
189. The exception might be a fully imagined game, like a chess problem or
a crossword puzzle, or, for that matter, the fictitious "Glass Bead Game," which
was an artwork in the form of a game. See HERMANN HESSE, THE GLASS BEAD
GAME (Richard & Clara Winston trans., Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1969) (1943).
The text of the chess problem, etc., is the fixation of an actual game, but it is
also a protectible work; the problem's creator is an author as well as a player.
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applying the rules was an author who was "expressing'
something, and made the products of that "expression"-the
individual part numbers-seem like protectible works of
authorship.
First, the informational dimension of a part number, its
paraphrasable message or statement, was the description of
the part that could be inferred by decoding its number.
Second, the structural dimension of a part number was the
sequence of digits dictated by Southco's numbering rules. 190
Third, the functional dimension of a part number was the
coding process that generated it, which includes the rules
that comprised the numbering system as well as the
purpose the system served. The problem is that many
human-made artifacts, like Southco's part numbers, convey
information, have structures, or embody functions, but all
the same are not works of authorship.
If the "message" or subject matter is the idea behind a
work, we have to ask whether freely willed self-expression
is possible if the information the work conveys
predetermines its form as well as its substance. This is the
underlying concern of the merger doctrine, as well as what
Judge Alito must have had in mind when he suggested that
simple works like part numbers should be deemed ineligible
for protection, with copyright reserved for those that
express more complex and indeterminate ideas. 191
Although numbers have the potential for serving as
vehicles of expression, they also reside at the lowest level of
expression in situations where they simply designate a part
or quantify factual information about it, such as the length
of a screw or the number of threads it has. The same might
be said about a work whose message is a prediction about
the winner of a baseball game or a horse race. If the work is
no more than a vehicle for delivering a predetermined
result, then the author's expressive contribution might be
little or none. Another way of putting this is to say that
even though the work communicates information, this type
of communication is more functional than expressive to a
point that tips the balance against an authorship claim.

190. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 149 n.2 (decoding,
as an example, part number 47-10-202-10).
191. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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If, as an alternative, the structure of a work is the idea
behind it, we need to consider whether the work's structure
can be independently expressive, apart, that is, from the
textual form through which it is realized. From a copyright
perspective, the determination of whether structure is
expressive or inexpressive depends, in the first place, on the
type of work. In compilations, the work's structure as a
principle of selection, organization, and arrangement is
deemed expressive for legal purposes as long as the author
has the discretion to substitute one structure for another. 192
What makes a compilation different from other works is
that its structure-the non-literal dimension of the text-is
deemed its sole expressive component, as long as the
structure is applied to a particular body of information. The
author has the right to prevent others from applying his or
her rule-basis to the same unorganized data for the purpose
of creating a competing work. In this sense, a compilation is
like a literary work turned inside-out, with the protected
element (selection, organization, and arrangement) being
essentially non-literal and the non-protected element (facts
or raw data) being essentially literal, rather than viceversa. The structure of a compilation moves to the idea side
of the idea-expression dichotomy only if it is imposed on the
author by the compilation's subject matter in the way, for
example, that the alphabetical arrangement of names listed
in a garden-variety white pages directory is traditional
and
193
commonplace enough to be practically inevitable.
Structure, in addition, serves to disqualify a
compilation from copyright protection whenever, in
conjunction with a formula for combining information into
an answer or other type of literal result-such as a price
estimate or a part number-it devolves into a system,
process, or method of operation. A consequence, exemplified
by Southco, is that the textual components of a rule-based
work, although original to the author, are not
independently
protectible if the work's rule-basis
systematically preempts any variation of the preconceived
plan. "Indeed, if any creativity were allowed to creep into
the numbering process," wrote Judge Alito, "the system

192. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-63
(1991).
193. See id.

490

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

would be defeated."'194
In pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, structure is
the non-literal element of form and is protected to the
extent that it is literally manifested in shape. 195 The
limitations imposed by the formal requirements of an
artform and the material substance of an artistic medium of
course may burden and even predetermine to some extent
what the artist can do in a work of art, but this kind of
physical or rule-constraint is not contrary to freely willed
self-expression.196 One could fancifully imagine, for
instance, that the finished sculpture already exists within
the block of marble, 197 but no one would seriously say that
the job of chiseling a sculpture out of stone is merely
laborious rather than expressive.
John Dewey fell back on the example of an athlete
engaged in a competitive sport to explain how creative
freedom can be reconciled with formal integrity:
Any skilled observer of a pugilist or a golf-player will, I suppose,
institute distinctions between what is done and how it is donebetween the knock-out and the manner of the delivery of a blow;
between the ball driven so many yards to such and such a line and
the way the drive was executed. The artist, the one engaged in
doing, will affect a similar distinction when he is interested in
correcting an habitual error or learning how better to secure a
given effect. Yet the act itself is exactly what it is because of how it
is done. In the act there is no distinction, but
perfect integration of
19 8
manner and content, form and substance.

The formal aspects of an artistic or literary work
become ideas, according to Judge Hand in Nichols, only at a
194. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).
195. "Form ....

can be defined roughly as structure manifesting itself in

shape." ERICH KAHLER, THE DISINTEGRATION OF FORM IN THE ARTS 4 (1968)
(emphasis in original).
196. "If where the rules not far enough extend,/ (Since rules were made but
to promote their end)/ Some lucky LICENCE answers to the full/ Th' intent
propos'd, that licence is the rule." ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 11
(facs. ed., Scolar Press 1970) (1711).
197. 'The Greeks reasoned that the perfect statue already existed in the
block of marble, and that it required only the genius of the sculptor to develop
its proportions." Werckmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir.
1904).
198. DEWEY, supra note 130, at 109.
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high level of abstraction from the literal text, which is
arrived at through a layperson's retrospective paraphrase of
the work rather than an expert's elucidation of the
conventions and genres that were available to the author. 199
At this high level of abstraction, however, the structural
attributes of aesthetic form lie on the far side of the ideaexpression dichotomy, that is to say, in the public
domain. 200
C. What Took the Form of a Treatise
Finally, if the idea behind the work of authorship is
how to perform a function, we have to ask what the author
intended the work to mean and to be. Any interpretation of

a work is also one of the intent behind

it;201

this is why the

author's intention is always the elusive missing link that
bridges the gap between expression and idea. 20 2 The nature
and quality of this intention becomes a copyright issue
when the facts of the case are poised between expression
and function. This is because expression and function are
both accomplished by an agent who has an intention to
make or to do something, and therefore, in this context at
least, do not stand on opposite sides of a dichotomy, 20 3 but

199. '"Thetestimony of an expert upon such issues," he wrote, "cumbers the
case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is led into the intricacies of
dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon the firmer, if more
naive, ground of its considered impressions upon its own perusal." See Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
200. See id. at 121.
201. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, in AGAINST
26 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 1985) (1982); Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A
Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1110-16 (2008).
202. David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and
Originality,38 Hous. L. REv. 1, 204-205 (2001):
THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM 5,

In short, for a defendant to be held an infringer, intent is not a
necessary ingredient. Nonetheless, it would seem that intent is a
necessary element of the act of authorship. Thus, although the
defendant need not copy intentionally to be held liable, the plaintiff
must intend to author in order for a work of authorship to emerge.
203. The function-expression dichotomy is a variant of the idea-expression
dichotomy and is often applied in merger cases, as Judge Becker did in Southco,
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on the same side. 20 4 Thus, when considering whether a
work is eligible for copyright-that is, whether it is the
product of freely willed self-expression-two basic questions
need to be asked. First, was the author's conduct
intentional? Second, if it was, did the author intend to
express him or herself, or did the author intend to perform
a function?
The first question raises two possibilities that lie at the
extreme ends of a spectrum. Conduct can be non-intentional
either because it is arbitrary and random, or predetermined
and coerced. Both these types of non-intentional conduct
must be considered inexpressive and the agent disqualified
as a copyright author. 205 In the Southco case, the court
identified both types of non-intentional conduct. Southco's
assignment of numbers to parts, if arbitrary and random,
was inexpressive because there was no reason for choosing
one number rather than another. 206 Southco's assignment of
numbers to parts, if systematically generated by a coding
process, was inexpressive because it was predetermined by

under the guise of the scdnes & faire doctrine. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
204. A question for another day is why we perceive a dichotomy between
function and expression in the first place. Larry Shiner suggested that the
dichotomy is a byproduct of the modern system of the arts. "For Aristotle, what
painting and tragedy have in common as imitations does not separate them in
their procedures from arts like shoemaking or medicine," he wrote. "As offensive
as it may be to our postromantic sensibilities, Aristotle believed that the
artisan/artist takes a particular raw material (human character/leather) and
uses a particular set of ideas and procedures (plot/shoe form) to produce a
product (tragedy/shoes)." LARRY SHINER, THE INVENTION OF ART: A CuLTURAL
HIsTORY 21 (2001). Indeed, one might define artworks as human-made artifacts
that have an expressive function. See infranote 223 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Hughes, supra note 172, at 114 ("Something will be considered
'creative' only when it appears to come from neither a purely mechanical
process, nor a purely random one.").
206. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2004)
(Becker, J., concurring) ("Arbitrary choices such as these do not satisfy the
originality requirement.").
This is not to say, however, that seemingly random choices that reflect
subconscious creative processes are inexpressive. See Durham, supra note 105,
at 629-631. Also it will not do to press too hard on this point because all
linguistic signs are basically arbitrary; for example, there is no intrinsic reason
why "cat" signifies a pet and "snow" a weather condition, rather than vice-versa.
This type of arbitrary choice, of course, occurs on the social rather than the
personal level, except in the exceptional case of trademark authorship.
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the application of the numbering rules. 20 7 The conclusion
either way was that the work was not the product of an
author's intention and therefore not an incarnation of freely
willed self-expression.
The second question takes us to an alternative path
that likewise branches in two directions. Suppose Southco
had established that its work was the product of an author's
intention. The nature and quality of that intent then comes
under scrutiny. Not all intentional conduct is expressive;
the other possibility is that the author's conduct was
functional. In a manner of speaking, Baker's useexplanation dichotomy was a suitable template for the ideaexpression dichotomy as it evolved in the twentieth century
because "use"
is analogous to "idea" and "explanation" to
"expression. ' 208 The problem, however, is that expression
realizes the author's idea in the form of the work. What
authors do is express themselves. In contrast, an author
may explain or describe the use of a process, system,
method of operation, etc., but this functionality is what the
explanation refers to, not what the explanation embodies,
much less what the author does. An author who invents a
method of bookkeeping is engaged in the practice of
bookkeeping, not the practice of authorship.
The method explained in Selden's treatise wasn't his
idea about bookkeeping, but rather his system of
bookkeeping. Even though the book conveyed Selden's
explanation of his system, the system was not an expressive
element of the book, either non-literal or literal, in the way
that plot and characters are non-literal elements of novels,
or lines, shapes and colors are literal elements of paintings.
Selden could expound upon his system of accounting in any
number of treatises, but his accounting system did not take
the form of a treatise. What took the form of a treatise was
his explanation of the system, which was all that his

207. Southco, 390 F.3d at 282 (Alito, J., majority opinion) ("an essential
attribute of the numbering process and the resulting numbers is an utter
absence of creativity").
208. See Samuelson, supra note 167, at 1953-61 (tracing Baker's emergence
as the seminal idea-expression case and critiquing Melville B. Nimmer's
tendentious reading of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)); Weinreb,
supra note 39, at 1174-76 (same).
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copyright protected.
His accounting system, however, did take the form of
the blank ledger pages in his treatise, which were tools of
the trade that the treatise explained. The blank ledger
pages were literal elements of Selden's accounting system.
Selden's readers were allowed to copy and use these pages
in order to practice the art of bookkeeping.2 10 A tool is
understood to be a functional object; neither the agent who
creates the tool, nor the one who uses it to perform a
function, is an author. An author nevertheless may have
"ideas" about a tool and express those ideas in the form of a
picture. A pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work that depicts
a purely functional thing, a hammer, for example, may be
eligible for copyright, even if the thing depicted, the
211
hammer, is not.

209. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2006) (stating that the owner of a copyright in a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work that portrays a useful article has no
exclusive rights to the making, distribution, or display of the object so
portrayed). Although it is inconsistent with the principle of Section 113(b),
Congress in 1990 enacted sui generis legislation to protect architectural works.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(8), 120(a), (b) (2006) (codifying the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990). The 1990 amendment overruled such cases
as Demetriades v.Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 663-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), which
had applied Baker v. Selden to limit the copyright of architectural designs to
protection against unauthorized copying of the plans themselves.
210. A similar right to copy could be inferred that would allow players to
copy the boards of copyrighted games, like Scrabble in particular. If game
boards are literal elements of board games, and games cannot be played
without them, the merger doctrine should allow players to make their own. This
is because the game board is an element of the game, not an element of the
game's explanation. "Doesn't Baker v. Seldin [sic] apply here? If you can't play
the game 'Scrabble' without using a substantially similar board, and if the game
itself is not copyrightable, then how is the board protected at all?" See Posting of
tfcotter to The Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/01/
scrabbling-copyright.html (Jan 16, 2008, 16:51 EST). Likewise, Scrabble's
individual game pieces-letters and numbers printed on wooden tiles-are not
works of authorship either, but rather are literal elements of the game, just as
Southco's part numbers were literal elements of its coding process.
211. The result is different in the U.K., where the copyright on rule-based
pictorial works, such as blueprints or architectural plans, extends to objects
produced by applying the rules, even if the article is purely functional, as long
as it would be recognizable from the picture to an average observer. See, e.g.,
Dorling v. Honnor Marine Ltd., [1965] Ch. 1; cf. British Leyland Motor Corp. v.
Armstrong Patents Co. Ltd., [1986] A.C. 577, 625-27 (H.L.) (holding that
Armstrong's manufacture of spare car parts infringed British Leyland's
copyright in mechanical drawings of the parts because the parts were "indirect
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D. Communication and Expression
What makes for confusion in copyright doctrine is that
the rhetoric of the idea-expression dichotomy can be
tailored to accommodate functional as well as expressive
conduct, and, in some cases, makes for an equally good (or
bad) fit. This is illustrated by Judge Roth's dissent in
Southco. She posed the question of what the idea was
behind the work. "Is Southco's 'idea,"' she asked, "the use of
a code to describe products, or is it the use of predetermined
numbers to portray given characteristics of a particular
product? 212 She believed that the first, more general idea
was the correct answer, but, in order to reach this
conclusion, or even to make this argument, it was necessary
for her to begin from the dubious premise that Southco had
an "idea" in the first place, rather than simply having a
purpose.
Her premise, however, was well-grounded in Third
Circuit precedent, specifically, Whelan Associates Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,213 in which the court had
concluded that a program's function should be considered
its "idea." Other courts have agreed that the idea for any
utilitarian work, not just software, is to perform the
function for which the work was designed. Hence, for
example, in Kregos Judge Newman observed that "[e]very
copies" of the drawings, but declining to enforce the copyright claim on the
principle of a motorist's supervening right to repair).
In 1983, Professor Paul Goldstein suggested that, despite Baker v. Selden,
the adaptation right could provide this kind of protection for rule-based works if
U.S. courts would learn to "view the relationship between bookkeeping texts,
dress designs and architectural plans on the one hand, and blank bookkeeping
forms, dresses and buildings on the other, as a relationship between underlying
works and derivative works." Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative
Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 209, 230 (1983). He
acknowledged that his proposal was "complicated by the fact that blank forms,
dresses and buildings . . . are generally viewed as uncopyrightable subject
matter because of their perceived utilitarian content," but argued that "[tihe
short answer to this is that the Act does not require that the derivative work be
protectible for its preparation to infringe." Id. at 231, 231 n.75. But see
Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1216-18 (countering with "the mandate of Baker v.
Selden").
212. Southco, 390 F.3d at 291.
213. 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he purpose or function of a
utilitarianwork would be the work's idea and everything that is not necessary to
that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea.").
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compiler of facts has the idea that his particular selection of
facts is useful. ' 214 This kind of "idea," unfortunately, is like
an all-purpose garment that conveniently suits all
occasions, but is not very comfortable for any particular
one, least of all the occasion of assessing the line between
215
idea and expression.
Indeed, the same bad fit is evident when one tries to
identify the idea behind a musical work; even if the music is
undoubtedly expressive, the idea that can be inferred from
it is often nothing more than that the composer intended to
write that piece of music, and not something else. Many
years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes defined music '21
as
"a rational collocation of sounds apart from concepts; 6
more recently, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[mlusic is
an art form that 'produces sounds and expresses moods,'
but it does not necessarily communicate separately
identifiable ideas. ' 21 7 In some cases, of course, the author of
a musical work does intend to convey an identifiable idea,
especially in pieces that have some didactic, programmatic,
or ideological substance. It makes sense, for instance, to say
that Dmitri Shostakovich's Seventh Symphony was about
the siege of Leningrad, but what was his String Quartet
Number One about? Probably nothing more than that he

214. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 706 (2d Cir. 1991). The nine
"useful" categories Kregos had chosen were expressive because "there are a
sufficient number of ways of expressing the idea of rating pitchers'
performances to preclude a ruling that the idea has merged into its expression."
Id. at 707. (This, of course, was a dubious assertion. See supra note 168.)
Shortly after Kregos, however, the Second Circuit staked out a disagreement
with the Third Circuit and narrowed the scope of copyright protection for
software by holding that the non-literal dimension of a computer program-the
idea-should be found in the specific structures of its interacting subroutines
rather than in the program's ultimate function or purpose. See Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1992).
215. Cf. Weinreb, supra note 39, at 1197-98 ("[The notion that the selection
and arrangement of facts may be, and usually are, creative expression founders
on the reality that most compilations are for a particular use, which dictates
both selection and arrangement."). A second uncomfortable "reality" about the
authorship of compilations is that even if the selection and arrangement rules
are granted to be creative rather than merely functional, the process of
realizing the compilation in textual form by applying the rules to a particular
body of facts, almost never is.
216. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 20 (1908)
(Holmes, J., concurring).
217. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
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wanted to try his hand at a string quartet. 218
A similar difficulty led Judge Lewis Kaplan to
comment, in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 219 that the
idea-expression distinction "breaks down" in the visual arts
because "it is impossible in most cases to speak of the
particular 'idea' captured, embodied, or conveyed by a work
of art" and "[f]urthermore, it is not clear that there is any
real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its
expression. An artist's idea, among other things, is to depict
a particular subject in a particular way. ' 220 In Baker v.
Selden, Justice Bradley had voiced much the same
misgiving. "Of course," he cautioned, "these observations
are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or pictorial
illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said,
that their form is their essence, and their object, the
production of
pleasure in their contemplation. This is their
1
final end."'22
The problem is that communication and expression are
allied but distinct concepts, and that expressive works do
not necessarily communicate information or make
statements, while functional-that is, inexpressive--works

218. 'The First String Quartet is 'a particular exercise in the form of a
quartet."' WILLIAM T. VOLLMAN, EUROPE CENTRAL 762 n.91 (2005) (citation
omitted).
219. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The case was an infringement
claim brought by the owner of a copyrighted photograph against a billboard
advertiser.
220. Id. at 458. It is not just the idea-expression distinction that breaks
down in the visual arts, but the expression-fixation one as well. In pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, the physical object in which the work is
embodied is not merely a copy of the work, but the work itself. The artist's
expression cannot be separated from its first fixation in pigment or marble,
which is the only authentic one. This is why a painting or sculpture can be
copied accurately or inaccurately-making an exact or inexact copy-or copied
with or without authorization, but cannot be "authentically" copied or repeated.
If, for instance, Mark Rothko had painted Ochre and Red on Red again, the
second painting would have been a work by Mark Rothko, but would not have
been Ochre and Red on Red. This is also why pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works are susceptible to forgery, while literary or musical ones are not: the first
fixation of a painting or sculpture is unique, unlike literary or musical works,
where the author's expression is first fixed but not uniquely realized in the
manuscript copy. See NELSON GOODMAN, THE LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH
TO A THEORY OF SYMBOLS 112-13 (2d ed. 1976).
221. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879).
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sometimes do. The abiding example of a work that
functioned by assisting communication was the ledger page
in Baker, which recorded and conveyed information about
the user's accounts, but was otherwise devoid of an author's
expression. Even when an author's expression does convey
information, that information may be tied so closely to the
form of the work that it cannot be restated or paraphrased
as an idea or message. A useful article in the form of a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, for example, may be
expressive enough to qualify for copyright protection if its
function is to portray its own appearance, 222 but such
witless self-display hardly makes the grade as an
informative statement, for it could be ascribed, with a little
work of authorship, but to
special pleading, not just to a 223
almost any human-made object.
CONCLUSION: THE ASPECT OF FORM
I repeat: in order for a book to exist, it is sufficient that it be
possible. Only the impossible is excluded. For example, no book is
also a staircase, though there are no doubt books that discuss and
deny and prove that possibility, and others whose structure
224
corresponds to that of a staircase.

The difficulty perhaps stems from the uniquely human
ability to have "ideas" about functions and to represent
them in textual or graphic form. As Erwin Panofsky pointed
out, "Beavers build dams. But they are unable, so far as we
know, to separate the very complicated actions involved
from a premeditated plan which might be laid down in a
222. See, e.g., Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 323
(2d Cir. 1996); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply
Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1996).
223. Ren6 Magritte's painting, The Treason of Images, portrays a pipe and is
paradoxically captioned "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" ('CThis is not a pipe"). See
ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW 245 (1980). The caption is contrary to

common sense, but nonetheless correct: although the painting is of a pipe, the
painting is not a pipe. The painting is meant to portray its own appearance as
well as the pipe's. If the painting's only function was to portray its subject, the
pipe could simply have been displayed as itself. This lazy person's strategy, in
fact, was tested by Marcel Duchamp with his "readymades," utilitarian
objects-such as urinals and bottle racks-that he exhibited, albeit with a little
special pleading, as realistic representations of themselves.
224. BORGES, supra note 28, at 117 n.3.
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drawing instead of being materialized in logs and stones. '225
That a function can be portrayed in the textual form of a
description or a drawing means that there will inevitably be
a blurring of the line between works that express an
author's ideas and those that merely convey useful
information or implement a utilitarian plan. 226 In Southco's
case, as noted earlier, the numbering rules were perhaps a
textual statement about the coding process as well as an
operational element of the process. 227 In addition, the
physical object in which the "work" is "fixed" may happen to
have functional characteristics as well as expressive ones;
228
as just noted, the useful articles doctrine in copyright law
wrestles with the problem of disentangling these qualities
other in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
from each
229
works.
225. ERWIN PANOFSKY, The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline, in
MEANING IN THE VIsuAL ARTS: PAPERS IN AND ON ART HISTORY 5

(Doubleday &

Co. 1955).
226. Even with this blurring, we can safely agree with Borges that a book
about staircases will always take the form of a book, rather than the form of a
staircase (although one could imagine the odd case of an exasperated reader

using a book about hammers to hammer down an obtruding nail). This formal
distinction is also true of computer programs, despite the statute's blurring of
the line between expression and function by its designation of software as a
type of literary work. A program in development will predictably take a verbal
or schematic textual form, but the digitized program, after being loaded into a
computer and activated in its electronic circuitry, will always be an operational
element of the computer's functionality in a non-textual electromagnetic form,
rather than a statement about the computer's functionality in any kind of
textual one.
227. What is true of numbering rules and programming rules might also be
true of legal rules, such as the model building code at issue in the Veeck case,
which lost its copyright protection when it was enacted into law by a
municipality. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 801 (5th
Cir. 2002). A model code is like a software program in development, a plan for
what the law could or should be. The paradox in Veeck was that the model code
and the enacted code were literally the same, but conceptually different: the
former a textual statement about the law and the latter an operational element
of the law.
228. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" to include "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned," but only if the work's
artistic features "can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article").
229. See Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 919-34
(7th Cir. 2004) (summarizing the conceptual separability doctrine as applied by
federal courts, particularly the Second Circuit).
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I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that the type of
agency exerted by the author must be the factor that finally
decides whether the work is expressive or functional, or, if
both, whether one or the other represents the work's true
character and quality. 230 Panofsky's view was that, at least
where artworks are concerned, the aspect of form looms
ever larger as the work moves from functional to
expressive. "If I write to a friend to ask him to dinner," he
observed,
[My letter is primarily a communication. But the more I shift my
emphasis to the form of my script, the more nearly does it become
a work of calligraphy; and the more I emphasize the form of my
language (I could even go so far as to invite him by a sonnet), the
2 31
more nearly does it become a work of literature or poetry.

This approach to artworks resonates with copyright's
policy of seeking the identity of a work in the form of words
freely chosen by an author. 23 2 The principle of expression
unfolds in mirror image from the same premise, that
authors intend to give form to their works through the
words they freely choose. To lose sight of this premise would
be like praising a traffic light for its vivid colors instead of
heeding its warning to step on the brakes. 233 Therefore, to
paraphrase Panofsky again and for the final time, where
the sphere of functionality ends and that of copyright

230. My suggestion is consistent with the position adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in the Pivot Point case. The court relied on Professor Robert Denicola's
argument that copyright's statutory limitations embody "an attempt to identify
elements whose form and appearance reflect the unconstrainedperspective of
the artist," and his conclusion that copyright protection therefore should

"ultimately . . . depend on the extent to which the work reflects artistic

expression uninhibited by functional considerations."Id. at 927 (quoting Robert
Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 741-42 (1983)) (emphasis
added).
231. PANOFSKY, supra note 219, at 12.
232. This policy's outermost boundary was marked by Stowe v. Thomas, 23
F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). Once more, this was the notorious
infringement action brought unsuccessfully by Harriet Beecher Stowe against a
Pennsylvania German newspaper for an unauthorized translation of Uncle
Tom's Cabin; see supra, note 53. She wrote the book in English, not German, so
her copyright protected the form of English words in which she chose to write it,
but not the form of German words into which someone else chose to translate it.
233. PANOFSKY, supra note 219, at 11.
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begins, depends on the intention of the author, which must
be freely willed and formally realized. 234 What this
intention is should be the first question we ask about the
work, even if it is not necessarily the last.

234. Id. at 12.
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APPENDIX

1. Games and Computers. A "rule-based" work can be
defined as any work that is made up, textually, of rules, or
produced, textually, by rules. In Southco, the numbering
rules were the former, and the part numbers were the
latter. This definition implies that computer programs
should be classified as rule-based works. "They consist of
sets of instructions which, when properly drafted, are used
in an almost limitless number of ways to release human
beings from.. . diverse mundane tasks," wrote the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) in its report to Congress in 1978.235 "The
instructions that make up a program may
be read,
understood, and followed by a human being." 236
If computer programs are rule-based works, an obvious
question is whether Southco's part numbers should be
equated to the binary digits of software code, which is also
functional, numerical, and rule-based. Comparing both to
the rules of a game might bridge the distance between
numbering rules and programming rules. A game is a basic
example of a rule-based work, which would include both the
game's rules and games that are played under the auspices
235. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 9-10 (1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT).

CONTU had been empanelled by Congress to report on how emerging
technologies could be accommodated by the 1976 Copyright Act. The statute, as
amended in 1980, pursuant to CONTU's recommendations, defines a "computer
program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)
(definitions).
CONTU was exaggerating to make its point when it claimed that the
instructions comprising a computer program can be "followed" by a human
being, as well as "read" and "understood" by one. A program can give
instructions to a person by means of an interface, and vice versa, but a person
cannot implement a program's instructions to a computer. Only the computer
can do that. "Although a screen display may contain instructions to the user, it
does not contain a set of instructions to be used in the computer to produce a
certain result. Rather, the screen display is itself the result produced by the
computer program." 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.15.3 (3d ed. 2005) (last
supplemented July 27, 2007). As noted above, see note 39, supra, the output is
not an element of the encoded program, but rather its product.
236. CONTU REPORT, supra note 229, at 10.
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of the rules. CONTU took it for granted that game rules are
238
protectible, 237 while games played by the rules are not.
This means that the rule-basis of a game may be protected
in its textual form, despite the non-protected status of an
actual contest between players.

237. Copyright, however, has been denied to simple game rules for lack of
originality. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79
(1st Cir. 1967) (applying merger doctrine); Milligan v. Worldwide Tupperware,
Inc., 972 F. Supp. 158, 162 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). It has also been denied to a
book explaining the rules of a game that was in the public domain. See
Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188-89
(2d Cir. 1975).
On the other hand, the National Basketball Association publishes a book of
"Official Rules" as well as a "Case Book" of questions and answers to NBA rules,
that together comprise eighty-five pages of dense typeface in its 2008-09,
Officials Media Guide, available at http://www.nba.com/media/2008-09RefereeGuide.pdf. It is difficult to imagine that these complex rules would be
denied copyright protection under the rationale of the Morrissey opinion.
238. See, e.g., Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d
Cir. 1997) ("[G]ame broadcasts are copyrightable while the underlying games
are not."); cf. Russell v. Ne. Publ'g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 572 (D. Mass. 1934)
(protecting the text of a game problem, but not its solution).
In 1960, a New Hampshire district court judge worried that the obvious
analogy between game rules and narrative forms was being overlooked-that
rules are non-literal elements of games, just like plots are non-literal elements
of dramas.
If the copyright law can protect dramas . .. there is no reason why it
cannot protect certain forms of public presentations in the form of
games or sports involving activity rather than mere words. It is a
question of drawing a line through the spectrum at one end of which is
the copyrightable television drama, at the other the T.V. quiz program
involving merely doubling the prize money after each correct answer.
In between are various sorts of plans, systems, and games involving
varying degrees of originality, imagination, and detail.
Briggs v. N.H. Trotting & Breeding Ass'n., 191 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D.N.H. 1960).
An updated version of this line-drawing question might ask how to classify
the televised reality series-as drama or game? In her Southco dissent, Judge
Roth assumed that T.V.'s Survivor as well as The Amazing Race, Fear Factor,
and Temptation Island are protected rule-based works, more like dramatic
performances than sporting events. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390
F.3d 276, 291 (3d Cir. 2004) (Roth, J., dissenting). A response to this
assumption, however, had been framed years earlier in a 1938 California case
involving a set of regulations for running a race: "Basically these pamphlets
have no fixed plot or story . . . .The mere fact that the race as staged is
entertaining or thrilling or arouses great excitement cannot in itself change the
essential nature of the composition so as to make it a drama." Seltzer v.
Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 629-30 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
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As CONTU would have it,
[t]he copyright status of the written rules for a game or a system
for the operation of a machine is unaffected by the fact that those
rules direct the actions of those who play the game or carry out the
process.... It follows, therefore, that there should likewise be no
distinction made between programs which are used in the
production of further copyrighted works and those which are not.
Should such a distinction be made, the likelihood is that
entrepreneurs would simply require that programs produce a
written and, by that token, an unquestionably copyrightable
version of their output to obtain copyright in the programs
239
themselves.

If this is so, no distinction should be made between
other rule-based works depending on whether instruction
set A generates protectible work B. The text of a cookbook,
for example, may be copyrighted as a literary work, 240 while
the non-textual dish prepared from following a recipe (i.e.,
the recipe's output) clearly may not be. In an Australian
case, the court made light of the notion that "everybody who
made a rabbit pie in accordance with the recipe in Mrs.
Beeton's Cookery Book would infringe the literary copyright
in that book. '' 241 The same holds true for dress patterns and

239. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 229, at 21. In this statement, CONTU
was rejecting Melville Nimmer's argument that a computer program should be
protected only if its output would also qualify as a work of authorship. Id. at 27.
CONTU thought this suggestion was based on a misguided analogy between
computer programs and other machine-readable artifacts, like phonorecords or
videotapes. Id. at 21. If the output of a sound recording is a musical work, which
itself is protectible, wrote Nimmer, then the output of a computer program
should likewise be some kind of protectible work. Id. at 27.
What Nimmer's analogy overlooked was that sound recordings in the form of
phonorecords and audiovisual programs in the form of videotapes are machinereadable copies of works, rather than works themselves; this is why their
"output" must take the perceptible form of works. In contrast, a computer
program is itself a work, not just a copy of one. Therefore, its output need not
take the form of another work. It does not follow, however, as CONTU seemed
to think, that every computer program encoded in software is necessarily a work
of authorship, rather than a functional machine part.
240. See Barbour v. Head, 178 F. Supp. 2d 758, 761-64 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(distinguishing Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.
1996)); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FL-122, RECIPES (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl122.html.
241. Cuisenaire
v. Reed, (1962) 5 F.L.R. 180, available at
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=JUD%2F5FLR180%2F00002. But
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finished2 garments; the pattern can be protected, but not the
24
dress.

see Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual PropertyProtectionfor the Creative Chef, or
How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477, 14991500 (1991) (arguing, perhaps whimsically, that a cake should be protected as
the performance of its recipe); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal
Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se
Copyrightable?,24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1131-37 (2007) (considering
same, but ultimately disagreeing).
A recipe is a literary work that takes the form of an order of words-a textbut the text is also a set of instructions for realizing a cooked dish. Why is the
cooked dish itself not a protectible work, or at least protectible as a copy,
performance, or adaptation of the recipe? If anything, the author's expression is
embodied in the cooked dish, not in the recipe for it. A diner perceives the
"work" by eating the dish, not by reading the recipe. The argument for copyright
protection would be that a recipe is a rule-based work, a set of instructions for
producing another rule-based work, a cooked dish. Although the cooked dish is
completely tangible (the recipe is not the "idea" behind the dish, nor is it a
restatement of the dish at a higher level of abstraction), this tangibility is
equally characteristic of works of art that have only one authentic copy-like
paintings and sculptures-without detracting from their protectible status. See
supra note 214.
The first problem with this argument is that the cooked dish is not a copy
(i.e., a fixation) of the recipe, but rather an implementation of it. The copy of the
recipe is what the diner does not eat, the recipe's written text. The preparation
of the dish is not a performance of the recipe either; a performance would be a
public reading of it, not using it in the kitchen to cook a meal. In addition, the
cooked dish is not any kind of work precisely because it has a recipe. A painting,
in contrast, is the product of an artist's self-expression. Processes, such as
recipes, are perhaps less mechanical than systems, but both are functional,
invariant, and inexpressive. The person who creates a process is an inventor,
not an author, and the person who uses one is an artisan, not an artist. (The
person who writes a recipe, however, is an author-the author of a recipe, not
the author of a cooked dish.)
Finally, there is the obvious functionality problem: it seems implausible
even to suggest that an edible work that is not merely perceived by the senses
but physically consumed by the perceiver is anything but functional. Maybe this
concern about functionality could be dismissed if the dish were like a perfume,
meant only to be savored and not eaten. Cf. Lanc6me Parfums et Beaut6 et cie
S.N.C. v. Kecofa B.V., L.A
2 (Dutch Ct. App., Den Bosch, 2004), available at
http://www.piercelaw.edu/assets/pdf/idea-vo145-nol-field-jr.pdf.
242. See, e.g., Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419-22 (5th
Cir. 2005); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, 112 F. Supp. 187, 188-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1934); cf. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Fabricand Dress Designs as
Protected by Copyright under Federal Copyright Act, 26 A.L.R. FED. 408 (1976).
Since the dress in the Jack Adelman case was a useful article, it could not be
copyrighted, although the graphic instructions from the designer to the tailor
could be and were. See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (criticizing
Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4095)).
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The difference between computer programs and coding
processes, however, is that the literal text of a programthe software code-is undoubtedly protected against
verbatim copying. The dispute is about the extent to which
the program's non-literal dimension (its structures and
functions) is also embraced by the work's copyright. The
issue raised by Southco's claim, in contrast, was the more
basic one of whether the literal text-the part numberscould be protected at all, given that the numbers were
generated by the non-protected coding process. 243 Southco,
in other words, was trying to assert that Kanebridge
infringed its copyright by copying the part numbers
generated by the coding process, even though it did not copy
the numbering rules that implemented the coding process,
which was like trying to claim infringement of a game
without claiming that anyone copied the game's rules, or of
a cooked dish without claiming that anyone copied the
recipe.
2. TranslationMachines and Cameras. Translations are
protectible as derivative works. 244 This presumes that a
translator is a type of author and that translation of a book
from English into German, for example, is an expressive
rather than a mechanical activity. If, however, the
translation were to be generated by a machine, then it
would not be protectible. The Sixth Circuit in ATC
Distribution gave the example of a book translated into
numerical code. "These numbers are no more copyrightable
than would be the fruit of an author's labors if she wrote a
book and then 'translated' it into numbers using a random
number generator for each letter in every word," wrote

243. See Southco, 390 F.3d at 296. Cf. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). The Lotus court held that the user
interface of a spreadsheet program was an unprotectible method of operation.
Id. at 815. Unlike Southco, Lotus did not claim that the output of its work-the
screen displays that visualized the user interface--constituted original
expression. Id. at 816 n.10. In fact, however, the program's screen displays did
embody (i.e., give form to) the program's menu command hierarchy, which
would have made it plausible for Lotus to argue that the screen displays were

protectible, even if the menu commands they "expressed" were not. What
generated the screen displays was not the user interface or its menu commands,
but the operation of the software in the computer.
244. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "derivative work" to include "a
translation").
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Judge Boggs. 245 "Even if the text in English was
copyrightable, the randomly generated list
of numbers that
6
comprised the 'translation' could not be." 24
In the Third Circuit, Southco had tried to parry a
similar concern about the mechanical quality of the coding
process by citing the Supreme Court's decision in BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.247 In 1884, the BurrowGiles court sustained the Copyright Act's protection of
photographs against the challenge that a photograph is a
machine-product rather than a work of authorship. Even
though the camera used to take a picture is undoubtedly a
machine, the Burrow-Giles court had held that the
photographer, in that case at least, was the picture's author
and not just the machine's operator.
While Southco admitted that its numbering rules had
predetermined all the possible numerical combinations
needed to produce any particular part number, it denied
that the resulting numbers were any less worthy of
protection than the photograph whose copyright had been
upheld in the Burrow-Giles case. This is because creating a
new part number by applying Southco's numbering rules
was analogous to clicking the shutter on a camera after the
picture has been framed in the viewfinder. Judges Roth and
Becker found the Burrow-Giles analogy persuasive; as
Judge Becker put it, "we should not pass by any of
Southco's choices evincing originality simply because they
were made before any part
numbers were actually
'248
computed and written down.
The flaw in the Burrow-Giles analogy, however, was
that it confused the author's expression of an idea with the
work's fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 249
245. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts,
Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 709 (6th Cir. 2005).
246. Id.; cf. supra note 200.
247. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The Burrow-Giles case dealt specifically with the
unauthorized reproduction of a photograph of Oscar Wilde taken by a celebrity
photographer, Napoleon Sarony. The Supreme Court held that the Wilde
photograph was comparable to a hand-painted portrait because of the artistic
choices made in preparing the setting and posing the subject. Id. at 60-61.
248. 390 F.3d at 288.
249. Judge Alito, alone on the panel, explicitly rejected the Burrow-Giles
analogy, which was the correct result, but for the wrong reason. He thought
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When, for instance, authors dictate their works, the
expression lies in the order of words spoken by the author,
and it does not matter whether the words are fixed in
tangible form by voice recognition software or by a scribe
holding a quill pen. 250 In like manner, the expression in the
Burrow-Giles photograph was realized when the portrait
251
was posed and the photographer clicked the shutter.
Although at this point a camera mechanically fixed the
portrait on film, the camera did not render the
photographer's creative process mechanical as well. To
claim otherwise would be like saying that the brush painted
the picture instead of the artist. 252 In contrast, the
intangible sequence of digits that made up a Southco part
number was the author's expression itself rather than the
tangible fixation of an author's expression-that253is, a
physical copy of a number in written or printed form.
that the analogy of Sarony's photograph to Southco's part numbers was
inapposite because "[t]he Southco numbers are purely functional [while] the
portrait of Oscar Wilde, whatever its artistic merit, was indisputably a work of
art." Id. at 284. The correct distinction in the context of this analogy was
between expression and fixation, not expression and function.
250. "When a blind poet dictates her poetry to a personal secretary,
although the secretary is responsible for the words gaining their existence in a
tangible form, the poet is the copyright author, not the secretary." Russ
VerSteeg, Defining 'Author" for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1323,
1349 (1996).
251. See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's
Response to the Invention of Photography,65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 427 (2004). To
be more precise, photography-at least in its pre-digital mode-is an art in
which the photograph is first fixed in the form of a negative, but must be
printed from the negative before it is fully realized. It is thus a two-stage art
like printmaking, and not a one-stage art like painting, because the form of the
work's original fixation, the negative, is not the form in which the work is
meant to be perceived. See GOODMAN, supranote 214, at 113-14.
252. A better example of a mechanism that mimics a creative process would
be a kaleidoscope. Software programs that transform raw data into abstract
visual imagery turn computers into something like high-tech kaleidoscopes. See
Tim McKeough, Frame that Spain! Data-Crunching Artists Transform the
World of Information, (2008) http://www.wired.com/special_multimedia/
2008/ff_dataart_1603.
253. In yet another analogous dispute, the page numbers in West's National
Reporter System-a compilation of judicial opinions-were mechanically
generated as a byproduct of its printing process, but the selection and
organization of the cases in its books was made through an editorial process,
and the page numbers inevitably reflected this deliberative arrangement. West
argued that its page numbers represented a virtual copy of the compilation
because a list of its citations would enable a reader to reconstitute all of the
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3. Coda.-On this last page, I would like to venture an
answer to the question with which I began, many pages
ago: if A is a set of rules and B a text or performance
generated by A-and at least one of the two is a 'work'-are
A and B two separate works, or two aspects of the same
work? Consider three possibilities. First, B is an intangible
form of expression given tangible form as A but A can only
be decoded by a machine, which must generate a
perceptible version of B. (Example: a performance of a
symphony is digitally encoded on a phonorecord, to be
played back on a phonograph.) Then A and B would be the
same work, or, more precisely, A a mechanical copy of B.
Second, A was created before B, and generates B, but B
could have been generated by a different A. (Example: a
software program produces a video game, but different
software could emulate that game without any copying of
the first program's code.) Then A and B would be two
different, although intertwined, works, A a literary work
and B an audiovisual work. Third, A existed prior to B and
engenders B as well. (Example: a set of numbering rules
generates a range of individual serial numbers.) Then A is
protectible as a literary work, but not protectible as a
system or process, while B is not a work of any kind. The
reader will recognize this last example as the Southco case.

cases in the same order. See Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ'g Co., 158
F.3d 693, 695-701 (2d Cir. 1998).
Nevertheless, it was implausible-and ultimately unavailing-for West to
say that these mechanically generated numbers deserved protection as
freestanding texts, apart from the books in which they served the simple
function of identifying pages in sequence. This, one might infer, is because the
formula that generated the page numbers came from the machine that
automatically inserted page breaks in the books, rather than from the
compilation embodied in the books. West was not the author of these numbering
rules.

